

**ANALYSIS OF THE INFLUENCE OF VIOLENT EXTREMISM IN KENYA'S
DEFENSE POLICY WITH SOMALI (2002-2022)**

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DECLARATION

This research project is my original work and has not been presented for a degree in any other University or for any other award.

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Date 08/04/2024

Supervisor's Approval

I confirm that the work reported in this research project was carried out by the candidate under my supervision.



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DEDICATION

I dedicate this research project to Queensy Bianca, Caleb Wellington and the entire family for their tireless support and prayers.



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ABSTRACT

Violent extremism has been a problem to Kenya in her efforts to reach sociopolitical height, with constant attacks from VEG the Al-Shabaab. In order to protect her sovereignty, nations interests it had to use both soft and hard diplomatic tools and approaches against VEG. Kenya's tradition of non-interference in other nation's affairs, peace-making, peace-building, non-aligned and respect, changed dramatically in October 2011. The KDF had never gone on an offensive military missions except for the usual UN Peace keeping mandates. However, with the increase in violent extremism activities from Al-Shabab. Kenya citing Article 52 of the UN charter, shifted her foreign policies to protect citizens through military operation in Somalia dubbed "Linda Nchi", building of Kenya-Somalia wall, and repatriation of refugees. Thus the justification of the study, the analyze of the influence of violent extremism in Kenya's Defense policy with Somalia from 2002-2022. The research objectives were: how border raids/attacks, how violent extremism financing has influenced Kenya's Defense policy with Somalia and lastly how violent extremism has impacted Kenya's relations in the international arena. The descriptive research design was used as the research focused on Audience Cost theory. The study site was Nairobi with the target population comprising of, Kenya Defence Forces, National Counter Terrorism Centre, Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Department of Immigration officials. The study sampling was through purposive and simple random sampling methods. The instruments used were, key informant interviews and questionnaire forms. Data was analyzed by use of NVIVO. This was done by categorizing main themes, putting each objective to test. The study established that, Kenya's defence policy with Somalia was influenced by: Violent extremism financing, cross border attacks / raids and violent extremism influenced Kenya's defence policy shift in the International realm. The research recommended that: Kenya and Somalia governments should have a bilateral agreement on identification, tracing and profiling of all the legal businesses or illegal sources of finance for violent extremist group sanctioned and closed down permanently. Formation of drugs enforcement units within the KDF to control, track and trace drugs and narcotics flow in the country especially, in the northern and coastal parts of the country. Kenyan and Somalia governments to collaborate in border security by border monitoring, sharing of intelligence and control the movement of people to deny entry of violent extremist groups. Use of modern equipment of hi-tech surveillance and armed unmanned aerial vehicle to secure the vast borderline between the two countries. A multilateral training and collaboration in the formulation of foreign policy approaches which are non-militaristic or punitive in nature to the neighboring countries. International collaboration and benchmarking with other nation states coping with violent extremism, such as the Philippines, United States of America and France, should endeavor be fostered to come up with the best solution.

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LIST OF ACRONYMS AND ABBREVIATIONS

ISIS:	Islamic State OF IRAQ
MFA:	Ministry of Foreign Affair
DOD:	Department of Defense
GWOT:	Global War on Terror
VEG:	Violent Extremist Groups
NSAG:	Non-State Armed Groups
KDF:	Kenya Defense Forces
PVE:	Prevention of Violent Extremism
CVE:	Counter Violent Extremism
POTA:	Prevention of Terrorism Act
UNMGSE:	United Nations Monitoring Group on Somalia and Eritrea
NGO:	Non-Governmental Organization
UNODC:	United Nation Office on Drugs and Crime

CHAPTER ONE: INTRODUCTION

1.1 BACKGROUND OF THE STUDY

Violent extremism is a complex thematic issue that has many underlying causes, including poverty, inequality, and political instability. It is also fueled by a variety of extremist ideologies with the aim to influence the achievement of a particular objective. Some of the most prominent VEG are Al-Qaida, ISIS, Africa's Boko Haram and Al-Shabaab. According to Shauri (2019), the rise and growth of regional and global violent extremist groups in Africa over the past 20 years is a major contributor to the continent's instability. With 48% of all terrorism-related deaths worldwide in 2021, Sub-Saharan Africa emerged as the new global center stage for violent extremism. Din (2011). In the Horn of Africa, that is, Ethiopia, South Sudan, Kenya, Eritrea, Djibouti, Sudan, and Somalia, is the new arena. According to UNDP Administrator Achim Steiner, the rise is not only detrimental to people's lives, security, and peace but also poses a risk of undoing development steps made over the years.

These VEG include Al Qaeda and Al Shabaab, which are spreading throughout the Horn of Africa. ISIS and Al-Qaida have captured the northern parts of Africa; and Boko Haram, is based in West Africa, in Nigeria, Cameroon, and some parts of Chad. The development of violent extremism in West Africa has created a security situation where nations like Nigeria and Cameroon, the Boko Haram operates freely, and case in point was the kidnapping of 200 Chibok girls. (Morena, 2020). These groups cross borders, mingle with the general population, making it very difficult to identify and weed them out. (Clercke, 2020)

As observed in the republic of Somalia, the northern parts of the DRC, and Mozambique to this day, violent extremist groups represent a certain portion of the continent's lengthy poor security, hence contributing to tractability of conflicts. (Nkomo, 2020). According to a 2016

UNDP assessment, Africa's open borders, together with widespread urbanisation, increasing number of young people, resource shortages, Internet access, and high levels of migration, have contributed to the wide spread of violent extremism.

Against this backdrop, nation-states have come up with changes in their domestic and foreign policies that are aimed at combating this menace. Foreign policy is a government's strategy for interacting with other nations, regional organisations, and international organizations. Webber and Smith put it as a collection of guiding concepts, aims, and aspirations for a country's foreign rules of engagement and international relations. It is frequently used to develop a coherent, consistent strategy for dealing with other nations which is based on a country's interests, beliefs, and ambitions. Developing a successful foreign policy requires careful consideration of a nation's geo-political climate, economic, security concerns, and international relationships. (Webber & Smith, 2000). Security and defence policy are essential parts of any government's efforts to protect its citizens. It is often seen as a balancing act between protecting the public from external threats and respecting civil liberties. As such, it is an ongoing process, with governments continuously. According to Ambeyi (2021), nations have both soft and hard diplomatic tools at their disposal to defend their sovereignty. Security and defence policy are some set of contingency plans put in place by a nation to ensure safety and security within her borders. This includes a wide range of measures, such as intelligence gathering, systems of alliance, border control, military operations, and diplomatic efforts. It also encompasses law implementation, regulations, and other steps to protect state security and national interests outside the borders.

Internationally, the US and her western allies have been the target of these VEGs, like Al-Qaida, and 9/11, which was the culmination, worst in American and world history. This was the conceptualization of the famous Global War on Terror the USA is known for. In 2015, a stakeholders meeting attended by several world leaders and non-state actors, was held at the

White House to develop a plan of action to help in the fight against violent extremism. Alexander (2020).assessing and adapting their defence policies to changing threats and circumstances. According to Morris (2019), In contrast to their long-held foreign policy of isolationism, America has abandoned her longstanding tradition of not intervening in nations affairs, with the advent of violent extremism it is now the world champion. Its multifaceted foreign policy on the subject includes steps to combat the danger on the diplomatic, economic, and military levels. (Al-Oraibi, 2021). The U.S. engages in diplomatic efforts to combat violent extremism; this includes discussing the issue with foreign governments, providing technical assistance, and working with international organizations. The U.S. also works to build strong relationships with countries that are vulnerable to violent extremism to prevent it from taking root. Such interventions have taken the form of Prevention and counter-violent extremism (PVE/CVE), among others. On many occasions, the U.S. has disrupted the financing of terrorist organizations and prevented the illicit flow of weapons and other resources to them through stabilization operations, which involve military assistance to countries facing the problems of violent extremism. (Alexander, 2020). During the Obama administration, the United States established the unmanned aerial vehicles strategy (Drone Policy) which has been used to conduct countless operations. Targeted elimination of top VEG leaders all over the world in the fight against violent extremism have been conducted without ever sending troops or active servicemen to such places. (Morris, 2019). This has however been condemned by many human right organizations for the collateral damage involved.

In Africa, Nigeria it had to change her foreign policy for her survival. The rise in cases of Boko Haram activities forced Nigeria to work with her sub-national organization and other nations like Cameroon to develop strategies to combat violent extremism within the region. Nigeria is engaging in counter-terrorism initiatives that hinder and respond to threats. These include, efforts to strengthen law enforcement and intelligence capabilities as well as developing

strategies to disrupt terrorist networks. Nigeria is also working with international partners like Russia for help in the weapon supply to strengthen border security and develop counter-terrorism strategies in the region. (Omutuyi, 2020)

In Kenya, before 2011, the KDF had never gone on offensive military missions except for the usual UN mandates all over, like in South Sudan, etc. The defence policy restricted such activities. However, with the increasing violent extremism activities of Al-Shabab, who began operating almost freely and conducting their activities in the country. This indicated, it was time for the government to change foreign policies approaches to protect her citizens from this menaces. This saw the launch of special military operation in Somalia dubbed “Linda Nchi,” loosely translated as protecting the nation. While the threat of Al-Shabaab has led to involvement in Somalia, extending from increased military assistance and support for the TFG, it culminated in the October 2011 decision to invade Somalia with the primary intention of destroying Al-Shabaab. The decision to openly engage Al-Shabaab militarily marked a profound change in Kenya's foreign policy and its decades-long stance of not involving itself with Somalia militarily. Significant resource allocation and numerous cross-border incursions by Al-Shabaab have seen no decisive result and have indelibly shaped Kenya's defence, foreign policy, perception of Somalia and the wider East Africa region. This has resulted in Al-Shabaab overshadowing Kenya's foreign policy and security issues in the region and has seen Kenya's security sector working with a foreign policy that is constantly reacting to and being shaped by its incursions with Al-Shabaab, as opposed to acting with a conscious self-generated strategy.

The geographical, historical, and social factors make Kenya a vulnerable state for violent extremist group operations. The location on the east coast of Africa, bordering Somalia a failed state and an international hub for Islamic extremist activities. The porous borders and a Muslim population has made the country prone to internal and external security threats. (Kelly, 2020) Kenya's military and political participation in Somalia has also made it a target for retribution

attacks, as was alluded to by Al Shabaab spokesperson Ali Mahmud Rage. Socio-economic marginalization of the Muslim community and a sense of alienation from central governance further creates a conducive environment for radicalization and recruitment. Since Kenya's independence in 1963, the country has never been able to settle on its national identity. A hybrid system of government consisting of tribal, ethnic, and Islamic law is testament to the fact that Kenyan citizens have never fully accepted a common national ideology. Post-2007 election violence and the increased threat of terrorism have only worked to further divide the nation along ethnic and religious lines. All of these factors provide a fertile environment for violent extremist groups looking to advance their ideologies by exploiting weaknesses in state control and by polarizing and recruiting society members. This study traced the history of violent extremism in the region. It looked at Kenya's national and international response to violent extremism, violent extremism financing and how cross border raids and attacks have played a role in the shift. The assessment of violent extremism and its impact on Kenya's defense policy and international relations is a topic that is quite significant. This is because it is not only a contemporary issue, but it is also an issue that will likely have great importance for the nation's future and security environment both regionally and internationally.

1.2 Statement of the Problem

Kenya and Somalia have established diplomatic relations over time, signing various socio-economic and political agreements. Kenya's foreign policy is defined as one based on the concept of not intervening in the internal affairs of other nations. Peace building, peacemaking, and commitment to regional as well as international organizations. It mediated the Somalia national reconciliation conference in Eldoret-Nairobi-Mbagathi under the guidance of IGAD, which undoubtedly shaped the future Kenya-Somalia ties. Since 1991 Kenya has been the host to refugees fleeing from the ever continuous conflicts in Somalia. These refugees were given shelter in Dadaab refugee camps deep inside Kenya's territory. (Osman, 2016). After

America's 9/11 and later the war on terror, violent extremist threats have spread throughout the entire globe. Despite numerous international and national counter-violent extremism measures and approaches being put in place, very little has been gained against the glaring threat. (Muller, 2020; Morema, 2020). In Kenya, the Al-Shabaab menace has resulted in socioeconomic effects throughout the country, including cross-border attacks, kidnappings, shootings, and bombings in shopping malls, schools, churches, aid workers, and tourists. (Mwai, 2020). It is the rise of Al-Shabaab and frequent attacks, especially in the North-Eastern, Nairobi, and Mombasa regions, that triggered a series of Kenya's defence strategies: The Kenya Defence Forces (KDF) special operation in Somalia in 2011 (Linda Nchi), which also marked the first time since independence that the KDF engaged in combat on foreign soil. (Kaburu, 2020). Kenya went ahead to close down her border with Somalia and eventually building of Kenya-Somalia border wall stretching from Mandera to Kiunga. (Mutisya, 2017). Closing down of Daadab refugee camp and eventually repatriating all the refugees back to Somalia (Agwanda, 2022). All these moves by the Kenyan government were considered serious diplomatic gestures that affected her relations with Somalia, thus the justification of the study to analyze the influence of violent extremism in Kenya's defence policy with Somalia from 2002–2022.

1.3 Purpose of the study.

The purpose of this study was to analyze the influence of violent extremism in Kenya's defense policy with Somalia from 2002-2022.

1.4 Objectives of the study

1.4.1 Main Objective

This research project was aimed at analyzing the role of violent extremism on changes in defense foreign policy of Kenya with Somali from 2002-2022.

1.4.2. Specifics

- i. To analyze the role of cross border raids and attacks in the influence of violent extremism in Kenya's defense policy from 2002 to 2022.
- ii. To analyze the role of financing in the influence of violent extremism in Kenya's defense policy with Somalia from 2002 to 2022.
- iii. To analyze the influence of violent extremism in Kenya's defense policy and international relations from 2002- 2022.

1.5. Research Questions

- I. How did cross border raids and attacks influence Kenya's defense policy with Somalia from 2002-2022?
- ii. How did violent extremism financing influence Kenya's defense policy with Somalia from 2002-2022?
- iii. How did violent extremism influence Kenya's defense policy and international relations from 2002- 2022?

1.6 Significance of Study

1.6.1 Policy

The research findings will benefit a variety of stakeholders, including: the study will enable the government to highlight some of the critical areas that will improve positive trans-border relations with other nation states. Moreover, it will help in the restoration of strain relations between the countries under consideration, as well as promotion of peaceful coexistence among the communities living in the region under review. Lastly, will help in eradicating the legitimate businesses and illegal businesses that finance violent extremist groups.

1.6.2 General Public

The study will help the local citizens understand the shifts in the foreign policy of Kenya and appreciate why they had to be done and what the influences or triggers were for the shifts.

1.6.3 Academic

This research will help scholars consolidate much-needed knowledge, which may have an impact on students studying international relations. Furthermore, it will contribute significantly to analytical skills and further research on how violent extremism affect various parts of the country, region and internationally. The study provides much-needed information on international relations between Kenya and Somalia, and how violent extremism has tested the long-standing relations between these two neighbors. It is an addition to the written sources of violent extremism and international relations to the Mount Kenya University.

1.7. Scope of the Study

A study's scope attempts to explain the parameters within which a study is conducted (Simon & Goes, 2013).

1.7.1 Geographical Scope

This study was conducted in Nairobi because it is the capital city and has all of the relevant offices. The researcher gathered data and conducted interviews with representatives of Kenya's Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Kenya Defense Forces, National Counter Terrorism Centre and immigration officials.

1.7.2 Chronological Scope

The study was limited to the period from 2002 to 2022. Within this time frame, there were active violent extremism activities within the Kenyan borders and her interests. During this time, there were concerted efforts from all stakeholders who were keen on eradicating the vice of violent extremism, an idea which was foreign to Kenya at the time. This also saw the

formulation of policies aimed at stopping the constant attacks, defence policies, and measures to prevent future attacks.

1.8 Limitations of the study

The research was conducted in Nairobi by gathering data from a male-dominated respondent group. This was in line with the Kenyan government's affirmative action on gender rule; the study was unable to meet a 50% gender balance rule, which would have been better to have equal or dissenting views from either side.

1.9 Delimitations of the Study

According to Kamau (2014), the limitations of a study are those aspects that a researcher is aware of even before going out for data collection and which have the potential to affect the research negatively, yet he or she has no control over them despite that knowledge. The study gathered data from 36.46% female and 63.54% male. This was necessitated by the fact that some women were on maternity leave and some on annual leave and couldn't be found to help with the research.

1.10. Assumptions of the Study

As Simon (2011) puts it, assumptions are factors which cannot be controlled by the researcher and if they are excluded from the research the study will be null and void or irrelevant. The research study was based on the assumptions that Kenya's Defence policy has shifted, therefore resulting in Kenya's building of the border wall with Somalia, special military operation in Somalia in 2011(Linda Nchi). This study also assumed that the data gathered from the respondents were honest and accurate to the best of their knowledge, as they were collected from the head offices of the various respondent's headquarters.

1.11 Definition of key terms

International relations: The interaction between states or organizations of different states that can be either economic, political or social interactions.

Trans border Raids: Attacks arising between two nations sharing a common border.

Violent Extremist Group: Any group, gang, or organization that has resorted to the use of violence against the government, populace and citizens to achieve her goals.

Small Arms and Light Weapons: Guns such AK 47, G3, including automatic weapons submachine guns, rifles, hand grenades and landmines.

Foreign policy: Objectives set by the government of a country on how it will relate, behave towards other countries and non-state actors.

Military operation: Use of military power to assert authority

Soft power: Diplomacy, economic development or Alternative Dispute Resolution mechanisms.

Hard power: Use of force, military or police

Violent extremism: Terrorism and terror related activities.



CHAPTER TWO: LITERATURE REVIEW

2.0. Introduction

This chapter discussed some of the available literature on the violent extremists and international relations. It discusses, empirical review on both independent and dependent variables, theoretical literature, conceptual model, literature review summary and literature gaps.

2.1 Empirical Literature Review

Internationally, the UN-General Assembly on Human Rights Council report A/HCR/31/65 observes that, with a lack of a unanimously agreed definition of VE/CVE, there is confusion in terms of strategies and policies towards mitigation. Mc Cant and Watts also agree there is no universal way that the PVE or CVE can be done. Khan, on the other hand, posits that commonly used preventive or countering measures are coercive, and it's very difficult to dissuade youths from joining, supporting, facilitating, and recruiting. The highest priority of the Security Council has been PVE/CVE, according to the level of threat it poses to international peace and general security. Security Council Resolution 1624, which was passed in 2005, advocated for its criminalization in national laws and international cooperation to counter-violent extremism, among others.

The United States has a lengthy history of foreign interventions in countries affected by violent extremism. Such interventions took the form of counterinsurgency operations, though reluctantly when the US national interests are not affected. According to Jason (2020), that changed after the famous 9/11/2001 attacks on the World Trade Centre and the Pentagon building. Countries such as Afghanistan and others in the Arab world were invaded by the

United States of America. However, some scholars, like Chomsky (2011), argue that the harm committed in such a process outweighs the good: millions of refugees, destruction of the country, and national heritage. Hanley (2005) asserts that the invasion of Iraq gave the rhetoric of bin Laden appeal to disaffected Muslims who did not want changes that attacked their culture, traditions, and beliefs that the U.S. occupation would bring. As mentioned above, even those who did not support radical ideologies were becoming increasingly anti-Western due to the imperialist dimension of the United States intervention and forcing democracy onto different cultures.

In Africa, according to the United Nations counter-terrorism unit, Nigeria and Somalia had the highest number of terrorism-related deaths in 2019. (Murugi, 2020) Between 2007 and 2019, Nigeria recorded over 20,000 deaths in over 4,000 terrorist attacks, while Somalia recorded over 7,000 fatalities in over 3,000 terrorist attacks (Shannan, 2020), a sentiment shared by Kanji (2018). Boko Haram, a terrorist organization that is responsible for the kidnapping of school children in Nigeria, has a wide network and connections in very many countries on the West African side of the continent. Murugi (2021), Somalia is a terrorist state due to the country's current security situation, which is due to a variety of factors, including the vastness of the country, clan divisions, and an unstable government to curb their activities. This made it safe haven for terrorists to operate in various parts of the country. In Somalia, a jihadist fundamentalist group, Al-Shabaab, is also responsible for the majority of terrorist attacks which are planned and carried out in Somalia, Uganda, and Kenya. (Varella, 2020). Local conflicts in Somalia have primarily aided terrorist organizations such as Al-Shabaab in expanding their capacity. These terrorist cells are capable of carrying out terrorist-related activities in the region, including Nairobi, Mombasa, and some parts of northern Kenya. (Pkalya, 2019). The Somalia theatre has attracted the services of the so called FTF (Foreign Terrorist Fighters) and homegrown terrorists who were able to move more freely between Kenya and Somalia, causing

mayhem in their wake. Suleiman Abdulla, a Yemeni national, is a prime illustration of someone who operated between the two countries before being discovered by authorities. Somalia's increased terrorist activities have made it a major source of concern for neighboring countries like Kenya and other international states like the United States of America, Ploch(2013) posits. Following the suspicion that Al-Shabaab was behind the terror attacks on Kenyan soil, Kenya decided to join Somalia in its fight against the group

2.1.1 Violent extremism financing and its influence on foreign policy changes

Financing violent extremism refers to providing financial support or resources with the intention that they be used to support the activities of violent extremist groups or to promote violent extremism. As is often the case in identifying and defining criminal activity, distinguishing between violent extremist financing and other types of funding for legitimate opposition movements or non-violent activities can be very difficult. It can also be difficult to distinguish between legal activities and illegal activities of violent extremist groups, and in some cases violent extremist groups have been known to engage in legitimate business to fund illegal activities. An understanding of the nature of VE financing is important because there is a common misperception that the financial activities of violent extremist groups are entirely illegal, and that they only engage in smuggling, counterfeiting, or other criminal activity as a means to an end. While many VE groups do finance a portion of their activities through criminal activity, it is often the case that activities which are deemed to be legal under the laws of the states in which they occur still contribute significantly to VE group finances. (Nassir, 2021). The risks of terrorism funding through actions such as money laundering are thus a reality. This has not gone unnoticed as nation-states are keen on tracing the sources, purpose and have either disrupted terror attack planning or arrested the perpetrators of such crime.

Internationally, the European Union (EU) has been an important target for international terrorist organizations, the Madrid Bombing and London train station incidents. Many research

have suggested that, due to this, the EU has aggressively revised and improved its international and internal policies to provide tighter anti-violent extremism financing regulations. (Bakowski & Ballegooij 2018) posit that, the EU has introduced and implemented an extensive array of measures to supplement and strengthen its laws and policies in order to eliminate or make it extremely difficult for terrorists and their supporters to engage in activities that promote terror financing. In June 2018, the Council of the European Union changed its anti-money laundering policy, for example, by reinforcing the authority of financial supervision authorities to improve their access to and exchange of information on customers and transactions between them and commercial banks. The Commission's mandate to maintain a list of non-EU countries deemed risky due to shortcomings in their anti-money laundering prevention regimes countries like Ghana, Syria, and Afghanistan, among others. More importantly to demand that financial transactions with these countries be subjected to additional scrutiny is another policy shift that has been influenced by the financing of terrorism. The fifth anti-money laundering directive (EU) 2018/843 and the directive (EU) 2015/849 contain these policy transfers, which are intended to strengthen oversight of third countries the Commission deems risky and to make it more difficult for supporters and accomplices of violent extremism to hide illicit cash behind fictitious corporate firms (Bloemkolk, 2015). The ultimate objective is to address VE financing in order to defeat VE.

The United States of America has also been a country of target by the VEG world over. At home there has been cases of homegrown incidences and in her interests overseas, like in the Middle East and, Africa there has been targeted attacks by the Al-Qaida and ISIS the embassy bombings in Nairobi and Tanzania in 1998. As the number one target for terrorists, along with its Western counterparts, the US authority is constantly modifying its policy approaches in order to protect itself and its allies against terror strikes. According to prior research findings, violent extremism financing is one of the main concerns that the United States intends to

address. The US government, working closely with other nation-states' parliaments and judicial institutions, has had to devise means of blocking violent extremism funding by making stringent measures to seal the loopholes that can be used by any VEG acquire cash or material support.

Utilizing multilateral coalitions, the United States has partnered with a various allies in the GWT. The US federal government has in the past backed and offered countries along with other world bodies with policy and strategies of tracing funds for VEGs. They have also assisted with relevant data and assessments to assist them in the fight against violent extremism financing. Other changes to policies in the United States to impede and prevent violent extremism financing include the blocking of suspected terrorists' financial accounts during investigations. A fact deemed by many human rights activist as 'anti-due process' as it violates the right to be deemed innocent unless proven otherwise (Rollins & Wyler, 2013).

The best example of the US sanction regime to states are: the Lockerbie (Scotland) incident, where Libya was adversely mentioned as the perpetrator of downing of a plane killing all passengers and the US designated Libya and her leader Mummer Gaddafi as terror sponsor. This led to frosty relations between Libya and the United States. Sanctions and embargos were imposed on Libya as a result. (Sule, 2021).Diplomatic relations between the USA and her Western allies towards Libya was suspended. Another incident was in 1993, when the Republic of Sudan was diplomatically isolated by the US while citing cases of sponsoring terrorist activities (Mumuni, 2017). Osama Bin- Ladden and his crew were training and planning their activities inside Sudan. This was further complicated as some factories in Sudan designated for fertilizer production started manufacturing chemicals for making bombs. This led to the suspension of ties with Sudan in 1996 and the closing of her embassy in Khartoum. Sudan was marooned, sanctioned and could not operate effectively in the international arena, this was later

reversed after Sudan paid penalties to the US (Bearak & Mohieddin, 2020; Ambeyi, 2021). All these were cases of shift in policy due to VE financing.

After the 9/11, the prosecutor in the United States while hunting for Osama Bin Laden, noted that, apart from being the mastermind of all the attacks on America's soil, he was also the sponsor of the attacks, having donated USD 250 million to the terrorist outfit (Ivancovich, 2015). This led to bounty being placed on his head, as manhunt internationally was on going. Any state that aided or helped him in anyway way was considered the enemy of the GWT hence the famous phrase by G.W. Bush " if you are not with us then you are against us" Countries like Afghanistan was labeled terrorist state with Taliban being terrorist regime. The US invaded Afghanistan to flush out the Taliban regime which offered Osama sanctuary, it's worth noting that Afghanistan was a long standing US ally of the. The US offered Afghanistan weapons and technical support during the Russia-Afghan war in the 80s. This was the first time the United States of America was invading a state on the mantra of " war against terror campaign" but also a policy shift on one of her former ally. (D'Sauza, 2012).

In Africa, countries are susceptible to the Money Laundering Act, drug trafficking, and terrorist attacks from various VEGs. This is very evident in countries like Mali, Chad, and the Central African Republic which are in protracted conflict with such groups (Clarke, 2016). According to Abraham & Hoffman (2017) and Sesay (2019). The countries most affected by terrorist attacks are those that terrorist organizations view as pro-Western allies in the GWT. According to Dingji et al, (2020), the majority of these attacks are carried out by terrorists from nearby countries who receive material and financial support from the parent terror cell to which they are affiliated. In certain cases, they also receive support from sympathizers within the attacked countries or from nearby countries. West Africa's power house, Nigeria and Cameroon have had their fair share of violent extremism from the Boko Haram. Nigeria and Cameroon have been immortal rivals dating back to the 1960s, this has further been compounded by the

ownership of the Bakassi Peninsula which both countries lay claim. Apart from the kidnappings like the, 200 Chibok girls and Dapchi girls in 2017 incidents where Boko Haram made headlines and a fortune as the government had to pay for the release of the girls. They also get their funds through bank robberies, cybercrimes, extortion, and illegal money services. (Abraham, 2020). In a turn of events, the inroads made by Boko Haram in both countries has brought a unity of purpose, where Nigeria and Cameroon work together to trace, track and profile legal businesses and other sources of finance for the VEG. This is through joint border control, joint military operations hence improved diplomatic relations.

In the Horn of Africa region, Ethiopia and Sudan had frosty relations with terrorism financing taking center stage. The regime of former Sudan president Mr. Omar Al-Bashir was being blamed for sponsoring, giving training ground and safe protection to terrorist organizations that were disturbing the peace and security in the region: A case being that of Osama Bin Laden from 1991–1996. (Duursma & Muller, 2019). A number of countries led anti-Sudan campaign through their policies. Uganda claimed financial and material support was being extended to the Lord Resistance Army Rebels. Ethiopia claimed financial as well as sanctuary was offered to the Islamic Front for the Oromo, and Eritrea claimed financial as well as military support was being offered to the Islamic Jihad, which was carrying out terror activities inside Eritrea. Using this as impetus, the Omar Al-Bashir rule was marred by allegations and was isolated diplomatically by many states as they withdrew their diplomatic relations. (Ambeyi 2021).

Terrorist financing has played a significant role in enabling and facilitating other terrorist-related activities in Kenya. Kenya had a good proportion of threats from various terror groups, as Ambeyi (2021) posits: transnational organized crime, terrorism in its various forms, human trafficking, and money laundering, the consequences of which are far-reaching. Osman (2017). Through this, a large amount of money is generated for violent extremist activities. Al Shabaab in Somalia abusing remittance companies by wiring large sums of money that local officials

cannot track, which is used to sponsor their terror acts even in Kenya and Uganda (Murugi, 2020). Before, there was absence of a financial intelligence unit in Kenya, this contributed to illegal cash transfers. Goldberg, (2015). As such, Kenya was listed as a key money laundering destination by a US report, which castigated the inadequacy of the Kenyan government to oversee financial transfers that are often mired with corruption and illegal trading (Ombati, 2017). According to Cauderwood (2014), it was unearthed that Kenya was supporting the terror activities of the militant group through its sugar importation. It is critical to recall that piracy on the Kenyan-Somalia coast was financially rewarding for Somalia-based and other international terrorists too. The use of cashless money like crypto currency from all over the world to finance violent extremism also posed difficulty to the security personnel before the VEG executed their attack. (Rafay, 2021), some bogus NGOs, were indicted for receiving funds in the name of charity work but diverted them to fund violent extremism in Kenya. According to UNODC (2021), faced with all the dilemmas of all the terrorist financing. Ambeyi (2021). The adoption and implementation of the global legal framework against terrorism financing has presented a watershed moment in preventing and combating terrorism financing. Kenya started the Financial Reporting Centre (FRC).It enacted, the Proceeds of Crime and Anti-Money Laundering Act (POCAMLA) 2009, later partnering with international organizations like the Eastern and Southern Africa Anti-Money Laundering Group (ESAAMLG), the Financial Action Task Force (FATF), and UNODC. This enabled Kenya partnership with other nations like South Africa in tracing funds meant for violent extremist's activities, disrupting the financial flow and the planned terror acts.

2.1.2 Cross-border attacks and raids and their influence on foreign policy shifts.

Internationally, the UN Charter in Article 2/4 states, "All member states refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any state, or in any manner inconsistent with the purpose of the United

Nations.” This principle has limited cross-border conflict between states, as the international laws make it very clear, but non-state actors like the VEG have no regard for these laws.

In the continental Europe, the European Union had to shift her policy and embrace collective security, this was after the events of the 9/11. The terrorist attack marked the beginning of events that disrupted the false security discourse in the entire world. As US which was considered very secure and safe was attacked, the language of collective security was rife to many states. Nations which saw extremism primarily as a domestic security concern to be handled by national authorities were alive to the new realities. As a result, EU counterterrorism policies were developed (Kaunert & Leonard, 2019). The declaration of violent extremism as a trans-border danger gained momentum in the 2000s as terrorist acts increased and the threat narrative changed. The attacks on Madrid in 2004 and London in 2005 were among the series of events that caused violent extremism to be unanimously considered an international threat affecting EU member states. The new debate, practices, and policies of treating terrorism as a trans-boundary danger were solidified. According to a study conducted by Kaunert and Leonard, the EU's collective security against terrorist activity has classified it as a specific type of security threat, one that calls for an inclusive and international action. This is the perfect example of the relationship between internal and external security. Distinction between "domestic" and "international" terrorism is arbitrary and unduly simplified (Sinnar, 2019). The training, funding, motivations, and radicalization that cross national boundaries all contribute to the merging of the two. Another factor is the sprout of social media and the internet as a platform for recruiting, radicalization, assaults, training, and group communication. Rather, violent extremism is best described as a trans-boundary danger since the EU is observing a more intricate weaving together of foreign and domestic components of violent extremism. While declaring extremism as a trans-border danger in EU security discourse Federica Mogherini, a former EU High Representative for Foreign and Security Policy (HR), asserted

that the EU's view of terrorist acts had changed from a predominantly internal problem to an inter-national dimension. (Mogherini, 2015, p. 3). Mogherini's assertion highlight the significance of the EU stance on combating terrorism, as the domestic terrorism has an international component and which is not a recent occurrence (Wittendorp, 2016). This was a major shift from a nation based security perspective to the union based problem hence collective security.

A breakdown in diplomatic relations due to a cross border raid and attack has been presented the case of Israel and Lebanon. Relations between Lebanon and Israel have been strained since the formation of Israel in 1948; however, Israel's withdrawal from Lebanon in 2000 gave rise to a growing diplomatic rapprochement between the two countries. This started to change in 2006 when Hezbollah launched an attack on Israeli military positions and patrols, in the process killing three Israeli soldiers and capturing two more. (Sharp et al 2006). This sparked a military campaign by Israel which included numerous air strikes, an air, naval blockade, and a ground invasion. This conflict continued for 33 days and resulted in the loss of 1,191 Lebanese and 165 Israeli lives. The event caused a massive increase in tensions between the two states and completely nullified any attempts of diplomacy for years to come. This one attack had a huge significance not only in Lebanon and Israel relations but also in the Israel-Syria peace talks. It also led to a domestic inquiry in Israel which led to the resignation of the Israeli defense minister and hope of an internal change in the strategy of conflict management with its Arab neighbors. This one isolated event had grave consequences due to its large scale of increased violence and resulted in a radical change in international relations in the region. (Salem, 2006)

In Africa, while ECOWAS has been praised for bringing regional integration to the West African region through the promotion of trans-border mobility and regional trade. Cameroon and Nigeria have been hit in terms of national security, as this has also encouraged transnational criminal acts by the Boko Haram members who are operating in both countries. (Anadi, 2005).

On several occasions, they have crossed international borders, raided, killed, and looted in the adjacent states. All this was done by foreign terrorist fighters (FTF) as they were described by the United Nations Counter Terrorism Centre (UNCCT) in 2014.

In the Sahel region, Mali, Niger, Chad, and Burkina Faso, the constant attacks by various terrorist organizations have exacerbated humanitarian problems that affected the African continent. The open borders have enabled groups like Jamaa't Nusratal-Islam wal-Muslimeen (JNIM) and Islamic State in the Greater Sahara (ISGS) to gain greater territories in the region. This has further destabilized governments and the country's security in the region, with no proper investments and international trade thriving. (Clerke, 2023). With inferior weapons and dwindling number of soldiers on the ground to offer proper protection against the VEGs, countries in the Sahel region had to ask for the services of the Wagner Group in the fight against terrorists. This is a serious security implication given the status of this group as being PSC (Private Security Contractors) and by that not answerable to the host state directly. These were major defence policy shift in the region. (Centre for Preventive Action, 2024) (Farrell& Weiss, 2023).

To give a glimpse of Kenya's challenges, it's one of the few nation states that share its borders with the state of Somalia. This border is vast and very difficult to secure, as some parts are deep in the Indian Ocean, making it very easy for Al-Shabaab to conduct their activities. (Muteti et al., 2018). By crossing borders, they always gain from abduction and kidnapping for money, like in 2011, when a French tourist woman Marie Dedieu was kidnaped in the Lamu area and evaded detection by the security agencies. (Muna, 2017)

In 2013, Westgate Mall was attacked; 200 people were killed and several others were injured. (Blanchard, 2013). In 2015, the most memorable cross-border attack was the one carried out at Garissa University College, where 148 students lost their lives, 79 were injured, and 700 were

taken hostage. Al-Shabaab and Al-Qaeda claimed responsibility (Mutambo and Hajir, 2015; Kibor, 2016). In response to the above problem, Kenya enacted a number of laws aimed at reducing the effects and attacks from the Al-Shabaab. The Kenyan government has been using counter-terrorism, preventive, deterrence, and punitive measures (military-centric) to solve the problem of violent extremism. According to Ogada, Kenya has also put in place policies like the Nyumba Kumi Initiative and legislation like the Prevention of Terrorism Act (POTA) 2012, among others, with the aim of suppressing violent extremism. This also was the culmination of the Kenya-Somalia border wall to reduce the cases of attacks from the VEG, this was seen as a policy shift on the part of Kenya given that, the Somalia Community live on both side of the border hence the action was dividing the families.

2.1.3 Impact of violent extremism on International relations

The groundbreaking event of 9/11 and subsequent 'war on terror' has changed the international relations/politics since the Cold War era. In recent years, academics and policymakers have started paying more attention to the global security environment and other areas as well. Although this assertion is increasingly being accepted, the impact of violent extremism on international relations and security is an area that is only just starting to be explored and remains under-theorized. There are many ways in which violent extremism has effected change in modern international relations and what it means for the future. Facets of international relations like, international law, diplomacy, security among others have been affected.

Internationally, International law experts allude that, world community reexamined international terrorism in light of the sad events of September 11, 2001. In the past, terrorist attacks were considered crimes committed by non-governmental organizations or individuals. The September 11 assaults, on the other hand, was considered an act of war. The scope of the attacks by VEG, and the declarations by several global capitals indicated the necessity for creating new tactics to deal with a new reality. In response, the United States with the active

assistance of the international community launched a massive offensive against Al-Qaeda and its host government, the Taliban regime in Afghanistan (Global Alliance on War on Terror). After WW2, for parties to certain agreements, nations retained the right to use force once specified first measures had been completed. A fundamentally a concept was brought to international relations by the UN Charter: a blanket ban on nation-states using force unilaterally. The UN Charter's article 2(4) contains the concept in its most authoritative version. All members shall refrain from threatening or using force against other states. (Imet, 2013). This ban covers not only the actual application of force but also the possibility of using force. For reason, any discussion regarding the validity of a state's use of force must start with article 2(4). Policy makers and academicians referred to it as the most important article of the Charter and have underlined its importance. A fresh paradigm in international law pertaining to the use of force was established by the attacks on US soil. The US reaction, and the international community's acceptance of the military action as an option, by passing Chapter VI which advocate for pacific settlement of disputes and directly going against Article 2/4 on the use of force against another state. The ancient tradition theory of international law on use of force, and armed attacks are tools of state-to-state relations was essentially made obsolete. According to Maogoto, force was now a tool for controlling the fallout from terrorist attacks; it was no longer only a grave danger to peace and stability but needed to be addressed through national and international legal systems. This occurrence that changed perspectives gave rise to a new angle in the global legal and political discourse. Even with the worldwide discussion about terrorism, the September 11 attacks raised the conversation to a new level. The attacks created traction for the framework of international law which incorporated military responses to counter terrorism within the regime of lawful force contained in the UN Charter article 51 right to self-defense which is often misused by the member states.

The United States, through the Department of State, has been keen to build global consensus to defeat violent extremist groups like ISIS and Hezbollah, which pose threats to her interests at home and overseas. For a long time, the US has kept a cold relationship with Sudan and Libya over the claim that the two states were sponsoring terrorism. Sudan was home and training ground for Osama Bin Laden in the 90s (Duursma & Muller, 2019), while Libya was responsible for the Scotland-Lockerbie incident. This was done by freezing assets and money held by such organizations overseas. Ambeyi (2021) further asserts that this led to the US severing relations with Sudan, closing down her embassy in Khartoum in 1996, and including Sudan in the list of countries sponsoring terrorists. This was a major foreign policy shift on the part of the US. This was later changed after Sudan paid a fine to the US government and later kicked out all the groups believed to be furthering terrorist activities. The same was true of Libya, which compensated the victims of the bombing of the flight.

Secondly, the risk of inter-state has been made yet alive the increase in frequency of extremist attacks worldwide and this may indicate a degradation of the Westphalia state system. Various continued attacks such as 9/11 in US, 7/7 in London, the Madrid Bombings, and various attacks throughout Pakistan have led to a frame shift in targeting of extremist violence. These attacks demonstrated a shift from attacks on military targets to attacks on purely civilian. A factor which is well stipulated in international humanitarian law, as the principle of distinction, and in away causing an increase in both attention to and severity of extremist attacks. Through simple comparison, it is reasonable to argue that state security against extremist threats has been nationalized and has subsequently led to increased discrimination and collective efforts by states to disassociate from any individuals or religious/cultural groups that may be connected with the violence. Such an increase in state action against extremists has had the effect of increasing the level of hostility between states in which the more perceived threat an individual state has, the more likely it is to lash out against others. An example of this can be

seen through Pakistan's attitude and actions against Afghanistan since the 9/11 attacks and subsequent spillover of military activity into Pakistani territory. With the absence of proper government presence in the region, there is a crisis in Afghanistan-Pakistan-Iran border. This has led to non-state actors to fill in the space, Al-Qaida ran guns, extortion of businesses, kidnappings, killings, and cross-border insurgencies (Neill, 2005). In 2024, Iran fired missiles at a terrorist (Jaish al-Adl) base deep inside Pakistan. This group has been attacking Iran in the Baluchistan Sistan regions. Two days later, the Pakistani army, using drones, rockets, and missiles, attacked a Balochistan Liberation Front inside Iran. The two countries later deescalated the situation, but tension is still high. (Cafiero, 2024). The two nations have enjoyed relative peace for long time, the events of violent extremism tested their resolve as they fired missiles at each other in the bid to suppress VEGs in each other's territory, which is a major foreign policy shift. This illustrates how increasing violent extremism may lead to traditional inter-state conflict as well as wars of intervention.

Additionally, the disruption of diplomatic relations in the contemporary context of violent international relations is significantly highlighted within the context of the contemporary international system. The events of September 11, the war on terrorism, and the invasion of Iraq in 2003 have all contributed to the subject matter at hand regarding the disruption of today's diplomatic relations by international terrorism. Under the Vienna Convention on diplomatic relations, diplomatic immunity was granted to two US embassy staff members who were involved in the killing of a Pakistani citizen in Islamabad. Despite both the US and Pakistani satisfaction in the resolution of the case, it is evident that the action taken by the US to gain immunity for these individuals represented the necessity for privileged treatment of diplomatic issues during a time when the activities of diplomats are in jeopardy. In an attempt to resolve the case, both countries were compelled to enact the dispute settlement provisions of the convention, which acts as a direct reflection of new ways terrorist and guerrilla groups

are forcing state actions into dispute or conflict resolution. On the flip side, high-profile cases of embassy bombings and kidnappings have resulted in the killing and injury of diplomatic staff and the taking of hostages. An example is the 2002 bombing of the Paradise Hotel at Kikambala, Kenya, where 13 people, including 3 Israeli diplomats, were killed. (Kasali, 2016) This attack also signified a direct hit against Israeli interests with the Zenit rocket attack on the plane carrying the Georgian president and the failed missile attack on an Israeli airliner, leaving a significant number of Israeli victims of the same. Another was the September 11/2012 Benghazi attack (Libya) of the US embassy and the killing of the ambassador Christopher Stevens and some of his staff by terrorists. (Milton, 2016, Lieberman & Collins, 2012) Owing to such incidents, many countries have opted for the resolution of disputes between diplomats by way of negotiation and agreement to prevent exacerbation of a given situation to levels of dispute into conflict.

Lastly, regional Security has been fronted by nation-states as enormous expenditure on security measures to battle and prevent future violent extremism activities can potentially place a heavier burden on a nation. Given economic and human cost analyses of the War on Terror, and opportunity cost hypothesis, which would fall under the category of actions that successfully stopped an unwanted behavior but eliminated the chance to benefit from taking a different course of action. In Africa, especially in West Africa, VEGs network, permitting them to develop formidable alliances with other groups involved in transnational activities in order to develop synergetic connections to maximize capabilities and effectiveness. (Bassioun, 2002 pg, 88). These alliances mutually support in arms, training, and supplies that they are using in increasing prominence of their deadly attacks. The politics of collective security has necessitated regional cooperation to combat terrorism and insurgency in the region. For both individual nations and the Economic Commission of West African States (ECOWAS) as a regional body, violent extremist has been a serious security problems. To address the security

concerns, ECOWAS has built a number of legal instruments and regulatory structures. Article 3 of the ECOWAS Protocol for Conflict Prevention, Management, Resolution, Peacekeeping and Security (1999) states that, its goal is to combat violent extremism. The Inter-Governmental Action Group against Money Laundering (GIABA) is another project whose goal is to make member states' governments more capable of stopping and managing the financing of terrorist organizations and insurgents in the area. The sub-regional collaboration on CT COIN (counterterrorism and counterinsurgency) activities in West Africa. Has been effective, as the daring and more serious attacks in the territories of this block has significantly reduced. Nigeria has also adopted an Afro-Centric foreign policy in the fight against the violent extremist group Boko Haram, where Nigeria collaborates with other West African states. Nigeria and Cameroon have had long-standing diplomatic tensions since 1960 over the oil-rich Bakassi Peninsula, which were occasioned by an embittered borderline dispute. With the arrival of Boko Haram in the region, Nigeria and Cameroon have often collaborated in the fight to secure their territorial integrity as well as regional peace and security. (Lukong, 2021)

In the Mali, African-led International Support Mission in Mali (AFISMA) comprising of many world states like France among others is another example of collective security. In accordance with Chapter VII of the UN Charter, the UN Security Council (UNSC) resolved to sanction the establishment of the African-led International Support Mission in Mali (AFISMA) after the UN unanimously endorsed Resolution 2085 (2012). The UN acknowledged that VEGs had been steadily infiltrating northern parts of Mali, presenting a major threat to the citizens. The UN was forced to conclude that the dangerous situation had the potential to impact the stability of the Sahel region, Africa, and the global community. In this context, these VEGs have been accused of committing various human rights crimes as they punish citizens who collaborate with the authorities. In order to bolster Mali's defence capabilities, the AFISMA was tasked with operating relations and coordination with the European Union and other relevant parties.

Its duties include providing backup and enablers to the Malian government in their primary capacity to safeguard citizens. (Bala & Tar, 2021)

In Kenya, before the new security dilemma posed by the violent extremist groups, as Mwangi (2017) rightly posits, Kenya's policy towards other nation-states was based on the principles of good neighborliness, peaceful coexistence, amicable dispute resolution, economic cooperation, shared prosperity, and regional solidarity. (Juma & Kikuvi, 2021) Kenya's regional policy was part of the pan-Africanist foreign policy that seeks to "promote sub-regional and regional integration and cooperation. The policy placed emphasis on intra-African trade as the foundation of Africa's socioeconomic and political unity. The external forces that affected Kenya's foreign policy process were inter-state organizations like the AU and international organizations like the UN International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) (Kibor, 2016). It is worth noting that Kenya has active militarily in the peacekeeping process, as there was no single time the military was deployed under Article 51 of the UN Charter. The 9/11 happenings in the United States of America brought about the system of alliance in the name of the Global War on Terror (GWT), led by America, of which Kenya is a member. (Onamu, 2015). The USA initiatives have really transformed Kenya and other African states; the African Crisis Response Initiative (ACRI); African Contingency Operation Training Assistance Program (ACOTA); lastly, the Global Peace Operation initiative (GPOI) (Kibor, 2016).) In 2002, during the Kikambala bombing in Mombasa, the government of Kenya and the United States collaborated in the security of embassies and places frequented by westerners. This also included the deployment of the British Army along Kenya's Sudan and Somalia borders, training of Kenya's Special Forces by the United States of America. This was not the case initially, as Pakistan was more preferred than the Horn of Africa by the US as strategic point to the GWT. Ethiopia and Kenya therefore became the most strategic partners in CT/PVE in

the region; this further cemented the security cooperation and Kenya-US relations to date. (Kobor, 2016).

2.4. Theoretical Framework

According to Bhattacharjee (2012), theory can be termed an interconnected set of constructs set to explain the behavior of certain conditions and groups. It explains why certain things are the way they are. Several theoretical perspectives have been advanced by many scholars to theorize the sudden rise of these cases in Kenya, this research project explored and explained:

2.4.1 Audience Cost Theory

Audience cost theory is a concept that suggests that leaders of a nation may be more likely to act in accordance with their stated foreign policy when they are aware that their citizens are watching. This concept was first proposed by economist Mancur Olson in 1965 and has since been used to explain a variety of political phenomena. The modern version of this theory was developed by James Fearon's (1994). This model posits that international events can greatly affect domestic and international audiences. The eminent threat to any leaders from domestic audiences is always immediate. The leaders are therefore very keen during crises and tend to avoid adventurous foreign policy, which may bring their rating down at home. Potter et al. (2019) Partel & Palmer posit. According to Quek (2021), a state may signal another state by communicating the unresolved cost that the other state would bear or pay. (Tied Hand Hypothesis). However, the costs imposed by international audiences take longer to materialize. As the leader's foreign policy gaffes accumulate, these costs lead to a loss of public image. If the signaler fails to react to the receiver's challenge, the message is very expensive. Zenobia et al. (2021) According to the theory, leaders who are unwilling to execute a threat are less likely to pay the cost in the first place, whereas leaders who incur the cost are viewed as brave by the audience. Toms confirms that any leader who makes threats but does not follow through is considered weak. Suzuki (2018) further states that foreign adversaries will be more likely to

back down from threats made by leaders of cost-sensitive regimes if they are aware of this because such threats carry a lot of weight. Partell & Palmer further note that the critical model cannot function in a non-democratic space as leaders are not pressured by the people and their opinions don't matter.

In the context of Kenya, the researcher used this theory to explain the recent shift in defence policy with Somalia following a series of attacks from the Al-Shabaab. In recent years, Kenya has shifted its defence foreign policy from one of neutrality to one of adventurous and active engagement. This is attested to by operation Linda Nchi. This shift has been driven by a variety of factors, including violent extremism and the need for greater regional stability. The shift in policy has been met with both praise and criticism from various parties, with some claiming that it is too aggressive and could lead to further instability. The theory suggests that leaders may be more likely to act in accordance with their stated foreign policy when they are aware that their citizens are watching. This is depicted in Kenya, as the population is highly engaged in politics. The presence of vibrant civil society like Muslims for Human Rights in Africa (MUHURI AFRICA), academicians, and learning institutions, who constantly put the government of the day in check, like it was the case following the brutal attacks at Garissa University. The effect of audience cost theory on Kenya's defence policy is still unclear. It is possible that the increased scrutiny of the population has had a positive effect, as it has encouraged the government to act in accordance with its stated foreign policy. It is also possible that the increased scrutiny has had a negative effect, as it has created a sense of pressure that has led to more aggressive foreign policy and miscalculation on the policymaker's side. This concept is critical in military crises, alliance systems, and economic sanctions, such as those imposed by Kenya's government on Somalia.


2.5 Conceptual framework

Figure 2.1 shows variables and depicts the relationship between the independent, intervening, and dependent variables. Independent variables such as financing of violent extremist groups: illegal money services, smuggling of drugs, narcotics, and goods. Cross-border raids and attacks: Al-Qaida and Al-Shabaab and the impacts of violent extremism on Kenya's defence policy and international relations. These indicators were a threat to Kenya as a nation, and as such, Kenya had to come up with legislation in some of the affected sectors, which directly affected Kenya's defence and foreign policy towards Somalia. This additionally shows how each independent variable indicator influenced Kenya's defence policy shifts in countering violent extremism, hence its relation to Somalia. The intervening variables were brought out by the interrelationship between the independent and dependent variables. These intervening variables are domestic and international audiences, which include, NGOs, opinion leaders, politicians, scholars, and local citizens. They are the factors that helped, pushed the government and policymakers to spring into action to respond to events that led to changes in Kenya's defence policy towards Somalia in the period under review. These were demonstrations from students, university dons, parents, and general members of the public who were fed up with the constant attacks and killings in the country. The responses by the government are what form the basis of the dependent variable. In the bid to curb the runaway terror activities across the nation, the government adopted various measures, such as the building of the Kenya-Somalia border, military operations in Somalia, immigration laws, military cooperation with other states, and closing down the Dadaab refugee camp. They were used as a deterrent, new policies to prevent further violent extremist attacks, to apprehend and prosecute those who engaged in such activities. Kenya's defence policies were changed to deny terrorists funding by obstructing the flow of illegally earned money, the smuggling of hard drugs and narcotics, and the smuggling of goods into or out of the country to fund their activities. A realistic solution to the

problem was preferable, and the unpredictability of the Somalia situation meant that Kenya's defence policy response ought to be proactive in nature whenever there was one. All this points to the fact that the government had to adjust, realign its defence policies to protect Kenya's territorial integrity and interests. Allison's organizational model of foreign policy decision-making would require Kenya to apply an all-hands-on-deck approach from all the stakeholders and government agencies.



Figure1: Conceptual Framework



Source: Author, 2023

2.6 Literature Review Summary

This chapter analyzed various literature on violent extremism financing, cross-border raids, and various positive and negative outcomes of violent extremism as far as its relationship with International relations internationally. The US in the 90s closed down her embassy in Sudan and added it to the list of states sponsoring and training terrorist. Other options have been to target the sources of finances of the VEG like piracy and abduction for romesome among others. Some scholars champion for the control of the border with countries with VEG challenges, like the case of Pakistan-Afghanistan. (Neill, 2005) In Africa through systems of alliance between nations, there has been a defeat of violent extremists in areas like Nigeria and Cameroon, this further point out that hard power techniques like the deployment of specialized police units and military operations have been used to prevent these attacks in any way possible. In Kenya since independence, there has been relative peace, but towards the beginning of the new millennium elements of terrorism has gained significance in the national arena. Three main topics all relate to the literature discussing: violent extremism, defense policy and international relations have been tackled. These three have been the main issues as the change of regime and governance take place every time. The role and perception of Kenya's influence in the region and internationally in security cannot be doubted as it has conducted various peacekeeping missions. Many authors have argued that governance or the state of leadership is the main factor and measure of success for a nation. Measures of success studies show governance has a significant influence on the future security environment and the chances of a conflict starting or reoccurring (Höffler and Dreher, 2007). This is backed by evidence of corruption and bad governance being an opportunity for extremists to exploit identity-based conflicts and gain the support of those who seek to alleviate their marginalization or plight. This is the situation which has been bedeviling Somalia and to some extent Kenya forcing the youths to join the VEG.

While critically looking into the case of Kenya with Somalia over the last two decades, there has been reduction in attacks inside Kenya and her interests in the region. Kenya has managed to achieve some objectives like, limiting terrorists' ability to send or receive money, punishing those who engage in violent extremism, and eliminating terrorism domestically. Some of these strategies have been used by the Kenyan government towards Somalia in the bid to eradicate violent extremism which a section of the population term as coercive in nature and one-sided in favor of Kenya. Mutahi et al. (2017). As Gichiri (2020) posits, when Al-Shabaab target Kenya, the response from citizens, government, and security agencies, tend to bring blanket punishment to Somali citizens, like refugee repatriation, closing of the border, and targeting some businesses in Kenya's soil. Therefore the researcher aims to investigate the influence violent extremism activities had on the Kenya's defence policy with Somalia over the last two decades.

2.7. Research Gaps

The above literature review has deduced that over a period of time, nation-states have shifted their foreign policies to address a particular issue affecting their national interest or their territorial integrity at that time. They may range from socio-economic to political in nature in the international arena. In this context, Kenya's shift in policy towards Somalia was informed by constant attacks from violent extremism, the need to protect her territorial integrity and the security of her citizens in particular. In the literature reviewed, it is clear that governments and regimes shift their policies to enable them to collaborate bilaterally or multilaterally with other nation-states to come up with counter-violent extremism and preventive measures. In the case of defense policy, at least for nations that are democratically oriented, this most often refers to a civilian ministry or agency of government (i.e., The Ministry of Defense). (Shabangu, 2009; Katumanga, 2011). With the Kenya's new constitution has changed the policy tool from regime centered security policy to citizen-centered security service provision. (Nzau & Guyo, 2018)

Ahmed (2016) in his work, ‘‘determinants of foreign policy formulation for developing countries, Kenya as the case study. He stated the actors in international arena UN and other non-state actors like Transparency International, the research omitted the contemporary non-state actors like the VEG, the Al-Shabaab and the Al-Qaida who in the recent past have shaped the foreign policies of various countries. While analyzing policies and strategies in Kenya’s response to the war on terror, (Kelly, 2020) used system theory and it’s use to discourage coercive strategies in dealing with the Al-Shabaab. Kelly, has omitted a very crucial strategy, multifaceted approach to the violent extremism menace. The soft and hard power among many others which were employed the Kenyan government to deal with the situation. She further asserts that, strategies applied by the Kenyan government this acted as a pulling factor for the sympathizers who trooped in to join the VEG. This theory omits the fact that, the majority of the victims and their families, student and the general population pushed the government to act on the Al-Shabaab. This informs the use of audience cost theory by the researcher to conform to the new reality brought about by the Kenya’s new constitution, the power of constituency to influence government’s actions. These measures range from blocking their entry points in cases of foreign terrorist fighters, cutting off their sources of finance, and countering their spread to other places.

All of the reviewed literature brought out the Western nation’s style of dealing with this menace. Numerous research studies on terrorism and counterterrorism in Kenya left out some basic and important gaps with regard to the application and shift of defence policy in counter-violence extremism and prevention. Building of border wall, refugee repatriation as it was the case in Dadaab in 2021. Studies carried out to establish how violent extremism has influenced Kenya’s defence policy with Somalia over the years are very limited. Furthermore, there hasn’t been much study identifying the legal and illicit sources of financing, like the smuggling of hard drugs and narcotics, the smuggling of contraband, animal poaching, and illegal money

services across the border with Kenya. Ambeyi (2020) in her research found out that terrorism financing was real in Kenya's case only confirming the issues of abductions with ransom demand, hawala money services and diaspora remission. The contributions of cross-border raids and attacks as an aspect of violence and extremism. Lastly, there is less written literature on the impact of violent extremism on Kenya's defence policy and international relations. In order to bring into perspective the influence of violent extremism in Kenya's defence policy shift with Somalia, there is a need to investigate and conduct a study of the above aspects. The study therefore aims to fill the research gaps in regard to the use of audience cost theory, goods and commodities which acted as sources of finance to the Al-Shabaab, role of border raids and attacks in the influence of violent extremism in Kenya's defence policy with Somalia from 2002 to 2022.



CHAPTER THREE: RESEARCH METHODOLOGY

3.1 Research Methodology

This section contains the framework for, research design, target population, study location, sampling procedure, sample size, sample distribution, data collection instruments, data collection procedure, Testing for validity and reliability of the instruments, data analysis procedure, and lastly ethical consideration of the study.

3.2 Research Design

This can be described as an elaborate plan meant to answer specific research questions by bringing in various components, strategies, and methods to collect data and how to analyze it to come up with a certifying conclusion. (Saunders, et al. 2012). Rahi (2012) posit that, research design is an all-encompassing approach used in bringing together different aspect of the study in a coherent and logical manner for a research issue to be understood. This study used descriptive research design as it used primary data / qualitative techniques to solve the problem, this was also chosen to help the researcher accurately bring the perspective of the respondents without leaving some of their valuable responses as it required deep and critical analysis to bring out the correct possible results needed. This is well suiting the assessment of violent extremism and how deep it has influenced the Kenya's defence policy with Somalia. The analysis was done by involving a mixture of quantitative and qualitative research approaches, this was done to improve the study outcome as it balanced out weakness of either strategies used.

3.3 Location of the Study

Even though the violent extremism menace existed in the whole of Kenya, the study was conducted in Nairobi City, the capital and administrative headquarters of the Republic of

Kenya. The choice of Nairobi was informed by the fact that it is the capital and the administrative city of Kenya therefore all the department which formed part of the respondents are all based there. The country Kenya is located in the Eastern Africa region and by extension forming part of the Horn of Africa. With a population of 47.6 million according to the 2019 population census, and more than 42 ethnic groups. Kenya shares border with Somalia to the east, Ethiopia to the north, Uganda to the west and Tanzania to the South.

3.4 Target population

All members of a group, people, who have or share same traits which is needed in the research process are target population (Borg et al. 2001). The research involved the following state agencies, National Counter Terrorism Centre, Immigration Officials, Department of Defense and Ministry of Foreign Affairs. All these actors were selected because of their daily policy formulation work and dealing in one way or the other with issues of security of the state. This entails research in violent extremism, combating such vice and coming up with various policies which help in the defence of Kenya against external forces.

Table 1: Target Population

Target Population	Frequency
National Counter Terrorism Centre	1,300
Immigration Officials	800
Department of Defence	7,000
Ministry of Foreign Affairs	1,000
Total	10,100

Source: Department of Defence, 2023, State Department of Interior and Coordination of National Government, 2023, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2023

3.5 Sample and Sampling procedures

This section gives an overview of the sample size, procedures, and techniques used in sampling by the researcher. The methods used in research were purposive and simple random sampling. This method was used to ensure fair chances for all the target population and to eradicate the chances of bias in the survey. The purposeful sampling technique was used to identify 20 key

informants from all the target departments in the research. Some of the questions needed very sensitive answers, which the general questionnaire couldn't capture. This could only incorporate the views of very few individuals within these targeted departments. Those who had deep understanding, perfect knowledge of security, defence, foreign policy, and violent extremism in Kenya during the time under review. As a result, in this research, respondents from assorted categories of the target population are likely to have differing viewpoints on the study's goals. This offered rich information on the topic under investigation and helped to bring out the study's results. This was used to identify and interview the higher management of the various departments involved. Simple random sampling was used for respondents who had to fill out the questionnaire forms as a requirement for this survey. It was used for the 384 respondents.

3.5.1 Sampling size

The respondents in this study were determined and derived at by the Andrew Fisher formulae (1981), where the population was greater than 10,000 to participate in this research. Where:

N = Target population is greater than 10,000

Z = Normal deviation at the desired confidence level (95%)

Z value at 95% is 1.96

N = percentage of people who have the desired trait

Confidence Interval was taken to be $\pm 5\%$. Since the proportion of the population with the characteristic is not known.

Sample Size = $(Z\text{-score})^2 \times \text{Standard Deviation} (1\text{-Standard deviation}) / (\text{Confidence interval})^2$

Sample size = $(1.96)^2 \times 0.5(0.5)$

$(0.5)^2$

0.964/ 0.0025

384.16

Sample size = 384

Table 2: Respondent's Sample Distribution

Target Population	Number of Respondents	(%) of Respondents	Purposive Sampling	Simple Random Sampling
National Counter Terrorism Center	60	15.6	5	55
Ministry of Foreign Affairs	137	35.7	5	132
Kenya Defense Forces	137	35.7	5	132
Immigration Officials	50	13.0	5	45
		100	20	364
Total	384			384

Source: Author (2023)

The researcher used purposive and simple random sampling techniques in the study in all the listed target population in the table 3.1 as shown above.

3.6. Data Collection Instruments

3.6.1 Questionnaire forms

Primary data was collected by administering the questionnaire to the sample population. The questionnaire consisted of a set of questions put together in order in forms that were administered by the researcher to the sample population. The closed-ended questionnaire was preferred; this acted as a guiding point for the interviewer to help the respondents stay on the correct trail of thought and relevance in the research. These forms empowered the respondents to stay focused on the subject matter and address the examination specifically (Leedy et al., 2001). The questionnaire had both open and closed questions focusing on the dependent and independent variables. Open-ended questions helped capture ideas that were not known to the researcher or included in the line of questioning. The questionnaire forms were used to answer research questions. (i) The role of cross border raid and attacks in the influence of violent extremism in Kenya's defence policy with Somalia. (ii) The role of violent extremism financing in Kenya's defence policy with Somalia. The primary rationale for selecting a

questionnaire was that it could be administered to a very large audience within the shortest time frame compared to other methods of data collection. The questionnaire was divided into segments: designation, level of education, department of the respondent, general questions of the subject matter, all questions formulated by the researcher.

3.6.2 Key informant interviews

Key informant interviews are important in providing resourceful information in the context of the research by Krishnaswamy (2006). This involved key informants, who are the higher management of the target groups; it involved a one-on-one discussion with the researcher. The interview was conducted with five personnel from every higher agency management, including the Immigration Department, NCTC, Department of Defence, and MFA departments of the government. The key informant question was the third, which only the key informants had to answer. This instrument was used in order to get a detailed, accurate, and valid perspective on the issues the research set out to investigate. The respondents in this category had the privy of knowing and having updated information in the field about the subject matter, as all the information flows to their office for analysis and action.

3.7 Data Collection Methods and Procedures

The most important aspect of any research project is data collection. It entails collecting data from the sample in order to answer the research questions. Mahoney and Goertz (2006). The investigator undertook interviews with the highest level of management in the departments in question. (Key informant interview). The interview schedule was developed for the top management of the targeted respondents (departments); it only had 3 sets of questions, which were exceptional to only 20 individuals, 5 from each department. There were segments for bio data, the name of the department, and background information about the respondent. The second part focused on the objectives of the research: the role of violent extremism financing in Kenya's defence policy with Somalia; the second covered the role of cross-border raids and

attacks in the influence of violent extremism in Kenya's defence policy with Somalia. The third objective is: influence of violent extremism on Kenya's defence policy and international relations.

Accuracy of data collection was done in all the targeted departments while observing all research ethics. Data collection was done in three weeks. In the first week, a letter of introduction was sent to the various departments of the target population, followed by copies of informed consent forms, which were attached to every questionnaire form sent to these groups mentioned above with the help of research assistants. This was for familiarization and filling out questionnaire forms, which were closed-ended with more than one-choice structure. In the second week, the researcher, with the help of research assistants, was able to reach key informants for interviews, and in the third week, the collection of fully filled-out forms from other respondents from those departments was done. The interviews were completed on time, and the feedback was very crucial in helping to understand the subject matter.

3.7 Testing for Validity and Reliability of Instruments

3.7.1 Reliability

Reliability is the ability of any assessment tool to give a constant outcome and result when put to use over a period of time. (Phelan, 2010) For reliability checks, tools were tested using test-retest methods to examine the consistency of the results. This was done by evaluating kappa and agreement level. The researcher used the process of coding and recoding with the same coding protocol. The primary coder was the researcher, and SME was the second coder. There was a positive correlation coefficient between the first and second occasions the tools were used. The tool was there to be reliable and more suitable for the same.

3.7.2 Instrument Validity

The validity of instruments is the accuracy with which they can measure what they are intended for (Twycross, 2015). The validity of the codes was determined by developing a comprehensive and structured coding protocol. A subject matter expert (SME) was used to review the protocol and node hierarchy, and items were revised based on the feedback.

3.8 Data Analysis Procedure

This can be described as the process of editing and decoding the information collected with the aim of detecting errors and omissions and cleaning up (Heale, 2015). Data coding, formatting, sorting, and editing were followed in most of the processing and analysis methods. All the data being qualitative in nature, descriptive techniques were applied. NVIVO was used as the analysing tool; it was done through the thematic analysis process for the research questions posed by the research. Also, the data-group relationship was well-designed to give explanations for the shift in proportions, patterns, and trends in the data. Data presentation was done by using tables, pie charts, and graphs.

3.9 Ethical considerations

These can be termed rules that act as bearing or guiding tools for any researcher carrying out research in any field of study, or rules of engagement (Bhattacharjee, 2012). The researcher ensured full compliance with the regulations governing research work at Mt. Kenya University. The Ethical Review Committee. (ERC). A NACOSTI certificate was obtained before the start of the data collection as a sign of compliance with research ethics. All respondents were informed of the reasons for the study, and rights in general were highly respected. Right to voluntarily participate and confidentiality as far as the respondent's identity is concerned.

CHAPTER FOUR: RESEARCH FINDINGS, ANALYSIS, PRESENTATION AND DISCUSSION

4.0 Introduction

The findings from the data collected have been extensively discussed, and additional comments on the findings are presented. This chapter is divided into two sections: general information obtained about the respondents' demographics, including their gender and occupation; research findings obtained from the field; and discussion.

4.1 Demographic Features

The data from the respondents of this study was based on gender, which was to get the responses of both sex as far as the investigation is concerned. Gender is very important in decision-making, stakeholder' engagement, and implementation strategy. (Graham et al. 2016). This was also done to ensure the results had input and to apply to everyone. Education was very crucial, as it helped in understanding the questions posed and providing in-depth response explanations. The respondent's occupation was critical in determining their department of origin to avoid inaccuracies in questionnaire monitoring and response to the questions posed. All these were very significant inputs while analysing the influence of violent extremism in Kenya's defence policy with Somalia.

4. 1. 2 Respondents Gender Information


The research took cognizance of the respondent's gender, following the suggestions of Petrich & Donnelly (2019) on the shift in relationship between Kenya and Somalia. The respondents were either male or female, as portrayed below.

Table 3: Gender Response.

Gender	Frequency	Percentage
Female	140	36.46%
Male	244	63.54%
Total	384	100.0

Source: Author, 2023

Figure 2: Percentage of the respondent's gender



Source: Author (2023)

According to Table 4.1 above, out of the 384 respondents, 140 (36.46%) were female, while the rest, 244 (63.54%), were male. There was a need to know the take of both genders as far as the research was concerned and also keep up with the affirmative action the Kenyan government has put in place on gender issues. 50/50 gender representation was not met in the study, as most women were on maternity leave and others were on their annual leave, so they couldn't be found during the data collection process. Lastly, the nature of activities involved in these agencies and departments are deemed menial this is confirmed by. (Ambeyi, 2021) Figure 4.1 illustrates the distribution in percentage of the respondent's gender.

4.1.2 Level of education of the Respondents


The research endeavored to take into consideration of the level of education of the respondents, this was to factor in their comprehension of the influence of violent extremism in Kenya's defense policy with Somalia. The frequencies were as follows, Secondary education, diploma, graduate and post-graduate

Table 4: Level of education of the Respondents

Education level	Frequency	Percentage
Secondary Education	42	10.93
Diploma	66	17.19
Graduate	214	60.94
Post Graduate	62	16.15
Total	384	100

Source: Author (2023)

Figure3: Level of education



Source: Author (2023)

From the table 4.2 above, out of the 384 respondents, 10.93% had ‘O’ level education. 17.19% had college diploma. 60.94% had university degree and 16.94% were post-graduate holders. Those with university degree were 76.09%, this clearly indicated that all the respondents had high literacy level, were able to understand research questions and answer them appropriately. It further indicated that respondents with diploma, degree and postgraduate contributed immensely to the outcome of this study, they were 93.28%. This also confirms the accuracy of response given by the respondents on array of questions answered by them. Figure 4.2 displays the distribution percentage of level of education.

4.1.3 Departments of the respondents


The study targeted and interviewed respondents from the following government departments; Kenya Defence Forces, Ministry of Foreign Affairs officials, National Counter Terrorism Centre officials and Immigration Officials. They deal with defence policy formulation and implementation and as such were in good position to give the much needed insights.as the distribution shown in the Table 4.3 below.

Table 5: Department of the Respondents

Respondents Department	Frequency	Percentage
National Counter Terrorism Centre	60	15.6
Ministry of Foreign Affairs	137	35.7
Kenya Defence Forces	137	35.7
Immigration Officials	50	13.0
Total	384	100

Source: Author (2023)

Figure 4: Respondent’s Department



Source: Author (2023)

Knowing the department of the respondents in this study is very important. Immigration Official had 13% of the respondents. National Counter Terrorism Centre had 15.6%. Ministry of Foreign Affairs had 35.7. Kenya Defence Forces had 35.7%. Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Kenya Defence Forces had the highest number of respondents. This was due to the fact that, the KDF deal with violent extremism both in the country and in Somalia making them suitable to have more respondents. As for the MFA, they deal with all foreign policies between Kenya and other nations making them very important part of this study. Figure 4.3 below showing distribution of respondent’s department.

4.1.4 Response Rate

The researcher dispatched 384 questionnaire forms, all were returned to the researcher. Key informant were all interviewed by the researcher as planned. All the questionnaires were filled correctly and as such were all used to enter data, therefor the researcher analyzed 384 research instruments making it 100% percent return rate which is well above the mandatory, as posited by Mugenda and Mugenda, (2003). Going by the study objectives and the research questions. The returned forms were cleaned, edited and coded. The respondents were 384 drowned from Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Immigration officials, National Counter Terrorism Centre and the

Kenya Defence Forces. The main objective of the research was to analysis the influence of violent extremism in Kenya’s defence policy with Somalia.

4.2 Presentation of the Research Findings and Analysis

4.2.1 The role of cross border raids and attacks in the influence of violent extremism in Kenya’s defence policy with Somalia from 2002-2022

The researcher sort to assess the role cross border raids and attacks had on the perceived changes of Kenya’s defence Policy with Somalia. As the tables below shows, the respondents demonstrated that, the raids and attacks include, abduction of government officials and tourists, attacks on military bases and security personnel, attacks on schools, shopping malls and churches and lastly attacks on motor vehicles in the larger North Eastern part of Kenya as shown in the Table 4.4 below.

Table 4.4. Types of Raids and Attacks distribution

The research embarked to interrogate types of raids and attacks that contributed to the shift in Kenya’s defence policy towards Somalia. Table 4.4 shows the distribution.

Table 6: Types of Attacks and Raids Distribution

Types of Attacks and Raids	Frequency	Percentage
Abduction of government officials and tourists	301	78.39
Attacks on military bases and security personnel	360	93.75
Attacks on schools, shopping malls and churches	384	100.0
Attacks on motor vehicles in the larger north Eastern part of Kenya	361	94.01

Attacks on government installations and communication equipment's.	260	67.71
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Source: Author (2023)

From the data above, 100% of the respondents agreed that, attacks on schools, shopping malls and churches, this agrees with (Miller et, al, 2022). 94.01% agreed that, attacks on motor vehicle in the larger north eastern parts of Kenya. 93.75% agreed that, attacks on military bases and security personnel, (Ras & Wario, 2023). 78.39% said, abduction of government officials and tourists and 67.71% said attacks on government installations and communication equipment. (U.S. Department of State- Country Report on Terrorism 2021: Kenya) it states how rampant and serious these attacks were in dealing with such targets, a fact being confirmed by the ISS. (Institute For Security Studies report- 2023). This attacks were done as a show strength, this was done by selecting some isolated and vulnerable targets. Strongly indicate that border attacks and raids contributed immensely to the changes the Kenyan government made towards Somalia.

Ways of entry into Kenya

The respondents were asked the major ways of entry in to Kenya from Somalia, a number of options were laid out and the respondents were allowed to choose more than once depending on their choice.


Table 7: Ways of entry into Kenya.

Ways of entry to Kenya	Frequency	Percentage
Through the vast Boni Forest	384	100
Through the Indian Ocean in Lamu and Kiunga areas	384	100

Trafficked by motor vehicles transporting goods across the border.	12	3.125
Through common roads from Somalia by the locals	203	52.9
Through major International Airports	14	3.65

Source: Author (2023)

Figure 5: Ways of entry into Kenya.



Source: Author, 2023.

The response was as follows, through the vast Boni Forest 100%. Through the Indian Ocean in Lamu and Kiunga areas 100%. Trafficked by motor vehicles transporting goods across the border 3.125%. Through common roads from Somalia by the locals 52.9%, and through major International Airports 3.65%.

All the above the results above show how porous Kenya border is, you can enter into Kenya from any border with Somalia a fact being corroborated by Isilow, (2019). The entry points which were challenge were the airports and this is due to the strict security code which cannot

allow them to carry guns, bombs and other weapons. The second was by motor vehicle carrying goods which are subjected to search in many police roadblocks along the way. This shows that cross border raids and attacks could be carried out from any point since there are multiple entry points. During the interview on why Kenya always, one respondent observed

”Kenya various foreign diplomatic missions and is considered the leading economy in the region, so an attack creates global attention and this acts as a motivation to their acts”

Kenya’s porous border has for long been the impediment in the stopping of the Al-Shabaab, places like vast, border stretching from Boni Forest, Kiunga stretching to the ocean where cannot be manned effectively. Respondents further observed that, the local population of Somalia origin are sympathizers of the Al-Shabaab and such help them in crossing the border and offer them shelter to evade the border patrol teams. (Isilow, 2019). This allowed the Al-Shabaab to attack school, churches, communication equipment, government facilities etc with the element of surprise then they retreat back to Somalia before being detected and arrested.

4.2.2. Contribution of Violent extremism financing to the influence of violent extremism in Kenya’s defence policy with Somalia.

In order to understand whole phenomenal of violent extremism, the research sort to know how the violent extremism group(Al-Shabaab) get their funding(Sources of Finance), illegal money services, smuggling of hard drugs and narcotics, illegal poaching and smuggling of goods across the borders as shown in the tables below Source: Primary Data, 2023.

4. 2.2.1. The smuggled hard drugs and narcotics that is used to finance violent extremism.


The study sort to investigate drugs and narcotics which are smuggled to finance violent extremism, they were, Bhang, Heroin, Cocaine and Opium. The respondents were allowed to choose more than once. The table below shows the distribution.

Table 8 : Type of drugs being smuggled

Smuggled Drugs / Narcotics	Frequency	Percentage
Bhang	30	7.81
Heroin	301	78.39
Cocaine	330	85.94
Opium	36	9.38

Source: Author (2023)

Figure 6: Smuggled drugs and narcotics



Source: Author (2023)

Pursuant to the findings of the research, cocaine 85.94%. 83.33% indicated bhang (Cannabis Sativa). 78.39% indicated heroin, and 9.38% indicated opium. From the data above, it is clear there was involvement of hard drugs and narcotics. These drugs were being transported through the Al-Shabaab controlled territories to the market like Kenya and some were left for the “motivation use” during their suicidal actions. (Shin, 2001), (Clerke, 2016) in violent extremism financing in the period under review.(Moshe, 2015, Cole,2018) Durnagol(2009) observes, drugs and narcotics contributes to violent extremism in a number of ways: it supplies cash for VEG, it promotes corruption in law enforcement and governmental/civil offices. All

these enable services which are useful for VE actions, movements of terrorist personnel, supports illicit arms acquisition, and the production of fake identification documents.

4.2.2.2. The goods being smuggled across the border to finance violent extremism.


The research sort to know which goods were being smuggled across the border to finance violent extremism, the researcher found out sugar, milk powder and animal products, rice and wear apparel were some of them, the table 4.7 show the distribution.

Table 9 : The distribution Smuggled goods

Smuggled Goods	Frequency	Percentage
Sugar	384	100
Milk powder and animal products	384	100
Rice	370	96.35
Wear apparel	100	26.04

Source: Author, 2023

Figure 7: Smuggled Goods



Source: Author (2023)

The results showed that most of the respondents 100% indicated sugar smuggling. This is supported by Rasmussen, (2017) that sugar being consumed in Kenya at that time mostly in the North Eastern part of the country was being smuggled from Somalia and the Al-Shabaab was controlling the flow therefore benefiting from the sale. 100% indicated milk powder and animal products. 96.35% indicated rice while 26.04% indicated wear apparel. A study carried out by Muteti et, al (2018), named (Borderland and Related Crimes and Security Threat in Kenya) indicated all the above items as sources of finance for the Al-Shabaab as they were being smuggled into the country from Somalia. This is also supported by a report by Journalist for Justice report-2015 indicating the smuggling activities in the border of Kenya and Somalia. Some of these goods were finding their way to the Eastleigh area of Nairobi. Profits from these goods would find their way back in Somalia where they couldn't be traced by both Kenya and Somalia authority.

4.2.2.3 The illegal wildlife gems being smuggled to finance violent Extremism.


The research sort to investigate illegal wildlife gems being smuggled and trafficked, Ivory, Game meat, Animal skin/hide and live animals were the most affected. Table 4.8 below shows distribution.

Table 10: The distribution of Illegal wildlife gems

Illegal wildlife Gems	Frequency	Percentage
Ivory	384	100
Game meat	340	88.54
Animal skin/hide	360	93.75
Live animals	180	46.88

Source: Author (2023)

Figure 8: Illegal Wildlife gems



Source: Author (2023)

As per the results of table 4.8 above, 100% indicated Ivory/tusks as the most trafficked. This confirms Maguire and Haelein (2015) on their work on illegal ivory trade. 93.75% indicated animal skin, 88.54% indicated game meat Muteti et.al (2018) and lastly 46.88% indicated live animals, Costa (2019). These were being sold in various markets in the Middle East and Asian, live animals like pangolin were being sold to the Arab world for domestication. Game meat and animal skin were sold in China, Qatar, Saudi Arabia and ivory found their way to Asian markets for rich clientele. All this money were channeled back for the VEG financing.

4.2.2.4 The illegal money services used in financing violent extremism.


The researcher sort to know some of the illegal money services for financing violent extremism, diaspora remittances, shadow/ untraceable banking systems, personal funding, extortion and taxation were the major areas of concern. They are distributed in the table 4.9 below.

Table 11: The distribution of Illegal money Services

Illegal money Services	Frequency	Percentage
Shadow/ untraceable banking system	200	52.08
Diaspora Remittances	310	80.73
Personal Funding	301	78.39
Extortion and taxation	384	100

Source: Author (2023)

Figure 9: Illegal money Services



Source: Author (2023)

On the basis of the results of table 4.9 above, all the respondents 100% agreed that taxation and extortion were the leading sources of finance this contents with the findings of UNMGSE report (2011). 80.73% indicated that diaspora remittances this supports Maguire and Haelein (2015). While 78.39 % indicted personal funding, 52.08% indicated Hawala (untraceable banking systems) (Ambeyi, 2021). (The U.S. Department of The Treasury, report of 2023.) (Africa Center for Strategic Studies report 2023). This shows how wide Al-Shabaab finance base was, including getting cash from all over the world from their sympathizers. This indicates how wide their influence was to the extent of getting foreign financial support, these sources ensured money could be accessed easily to fund their activities.

4.2.3. Influence of violent extremism in Kenya's defence policy and international relations from 2002-2022

The study sort to analyze the influence of violent extremism in Kenya's defence policy and the International relations as a whole. This was a key informant interview question, where 5 respondents from each higher management of National Counter Terrorism Centre, Kenya

Defence Forces, Immigration officials and Ministry of Foreign Affairs personnel were involved. The total number of the respondents was 20. Table 4.10 below show the distribution.

Table 4.10: violent extremism on Kenya’s defence policy and International Relations

From the key informant point of view, the research sort to know the areas of Kenya defence’s policy and international relations were affected by the violent extremism. This was informed by the fact that, to the public, Kenya seem alone in the fight against the Al-Shabaab with no visible support from known allies internationally. Respondents gave their various opinion on the same and they were distributed as follows, National Security Readiness, Military Standardizations (Joint Military Training with, other nations) Military Alliance. Coordination with other states in International Policing. Restriction on direct flights from Somalia. National border Surveillance. Strict immigration laws and regulations. Lastly, building of Kenya-Somalia border wall.


Table 12: The distribution of areas of concern

Areas of concern	Frequency	Percentage
National Security Readiness. Military Standardizations Joint Military Training with other nations	18	90
Military Alliance	12	60
Coordination with other states in International Policing	9	45
Restriction on direct flights from Somalia	16	80
National border Surveillance	14	70
Strict immigration laws and regulations	18	90

Building of Kenya- Somalia border wall	8	40
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Source: Author (2023)

Table 13: Areas of Concern



Source: Author, 2023

According to Table 4.10, violent extremism has resulted in the following changes in Kenya's defence policy and in international relations: 90% of the respondents indicated that: National security Readiness, military standardization, and joint military training with other nations this confirms, (Onamu, 2015). Strict immigration laws and regulations had a 90% success rate, this confirms (Odera, 2015) on the refugee situation, as also proposed by (Agwanda, 2022). Restriction on direct flights from Somalia had 80% rating approval. National border surveillance received 70%. The military alliance received 60%, validating (Munene, 2015) position on the East Africa Standby Force (EASF) and Combined Joint Task Force-Horn of Africa (CJTF-HOA). Coordination with other governments in international policing received 45%, and the construction of the Kenya-Somalia border wall received 40%, matching (Mutisya, 2017). The results above show areas where the rise of violent extremism impacted in the period

under review. They also indicate how much of a menace VE has been to Kenya to the extent of making these multilateral and bilateral bold moves in the international arena.

4.3 Discussions

4.3.1. Cross-border attacks and raids on Kenya's defence policy with Somalia.

To counter the constant attacks and raids by the Al-Shabaab from Somalia, which were claiming more lives in schools, churches, etc., the Kenyan government came up with various legislation, like the Prevention of Terrorism Act (POTA), which was passed in 2012 to counter the growing influence of violent extremism in the country. This Act criminalized terrorist acts, including those that are committed with the intention of intimidating the public. It also criminalized all the groups that the government of Kenya feels are a danger to its national security.

In early 2015, the Kenyan government made a decision to build a Kenya-Somalia border wall over a distance of 700 km, starting from Kiunga to Mandera. This was a major foreign policy shift from the normal of good neighborliness to that of isolation from Somalia. (Mutisya, 2017). The decision was hailed by many as a lasting solution to sporadic raids and attacks, but Somalis viewed it as a major act of separating families who appear to have relatives in both countries. In Africa, IGAD came up with preventing and countering violent extremism programs and later founded a Centre of Excellence for Prevention of and Countering Violent Extremism. Amidst all this development, Kenya is the only country in the Horn of Africa that has formal CVE policies to support the obvious, which some scholars consider punitive in nature. (Gichiri, 2020). The National Strategy for CVE was formed in 2016 to coordinate the efforts of various government agencies in combating terrorism. The NCTC is responsible for intelligence gathering, analysis, and dissemination. According to the NCTC, it also works closely with the police and other security agencies to develop and implement counter-terrorism strategies. It

also works with the media to educate the public about how to stay safe in public areas where there may be a threat of terrorism. Mutahi et al. (2017), the securitized hypothesis has long been fronted by the Kenyan government. Gichiri (2020) notes that Kenya has not coherently put in place CVE policies and national security mechanisms but instead has adopted GWOT mechanisms.

In 2011, Kenya deployed the Kenya Defence Forces (KDF) into Somalia under Article 52 of the UN Charter to defend itself from the Al-Shabaab's constant raids in its territory. The intervention by Kenya's Defence Forces (KDF), dubbed Linda Nchi, attempted to protect its territory from other foreign aggressors. This marked the first time since independence that the KDF engaged in combat on foreign soil. The operation Linda Nchi initiative later integrated with the AMISOM in the war against terrorism in Somalia. This saw, the coming of Senegal, Uganda and other forces into the picture. (Kelly, 2020)

In March 2021, Kenya called for the disbandment of Dadaab and handed the UNHCR exactly two weeks to develop a strategy. The camp housed refugees from Somalia, some of whom were born and raised in the camp. The Kenyan government cited cases of terrorism planning, hosting, recruitment, and execution in the refugee camp, which were done by the violent extremist group members who were operating inside the camp as undocumented refugees. Hence the call for closer, which aimed at reducing the cases of attacks and constant raids inside Kenyan territorial grounds. All these were seen as major shifts in Kenya's defence policy towards Somalia. This clearly indicates that border attacks and raids played a significant role in the Kenyan government's defence policy shift towards Somalia.

4.3.2. The role of financing in the influence of violent extremism in Kenya's defence policy with Somalia

To curb violent extremist financing, the Kenyan government came up with assorted remedies, some targeting local financial and international systems. Following a series of attacks in Kenya, particularly in the aftermath of the Garissa University attack. Kenya began to exercise tougher measures with regards to controlling the movement of finances. The adoption and implementation of the global legal framework against terrorism financing have represented a watershed moment in preventing and combating terrorism financing. Kenya acted decisively to adjust its defence policy to sanction foreign governments' intervention and assistance in combating the threat. It was unearthed that Kenya was supporting the terror activities of the militant group through its sugar importation; this is supported by Rasmussen (2017), which was being smuggled and sold to the local Kenyan market at a price lower than the locally manufactured sugar. Kenya's military intervention in Somalia targeted key financial hubs such as the port of Kismayu, which acted as the transit point for charcoal going to the Middle East. Other legitimate businesses in Somalia also lost their constant supply as the port was closed down. These businesses were being extorted by the Al-Shabaab, which formed part of their sources of income. The government also shut down money transfer firms under suspicion of covert activities with the al-Shabaab; 86 closures were reported. (Kimani, 2018). These firms were responsible for the transaction of money between the Somali community and their business counterparts inside Somalia.

The Anti-Money Laundering and Counter-Terrorism Financing Act: The Anti-Money Laundering and Counter-Terrorism Financing Act (AML/CTF) was passed in 2019 to address the financing of terrorism. The Act requires financial institutions and other entities to report suspicious transactions and to take measures to prevent money laundering and the financing of terrorism. The Act also requires financial institutions to maintain records of all transactions

and verify the identities of their customers. It also provides for the confiscation of property belonging to those convicted of terrorism-related offenses. Proceeds of Crime and Anti-Money Laundering Act. The latter act was signed into law in 2017. The goal of the act is to impede corruption as well as fight against the financing of terrorism and its related activities (Kenya Law, 2012). This law was to prevent the high cases of violent extremist financing; it clearly stipulated that cash in transit from jurisdictions like Yemen, Iraq, Colombia, and Somalia into and out of Kenya is totally blocked out. All the above laws and defence strategies affected the movement of goods, services, and people from Somalia into Kenya, which meant a permanent closure of some businesses that depended on Kenya for survival. A move that is painful but necessary for Kenya's defence policy with Somalia.

4.3.3 Influence of Violent Extremism on Kenya's Defence Policy and International

Relations

Global integration has brought new and greater global security challenges. They are far reaching and surpassing the inter-state conflict or unrest within the state that were the norm in other centuries. As globalization strives to reach all corners of the world, so does the complexity of these security threats. With the exception of multilateral peacekeeping missions, Kenya's defence forces had never engaged in an offensive military operation. In 2011, Kenya took on a military intervention campaign against the al-Shabaab with the hope of keeping Kenya safe. Kaburu, (2020). The operation, dubbed "Operation Linda Nchi, it was designed to buffer the vast area dividing Kenya and Somalia.

There can never be positive impacts of violent extremist activities on the affected country, but in the case of Kenya, there were positive steps and gains made by the successive regimes towards improving the country's international relations, especially in terms of defence and security. Alliances, military improvements, and other border security capabilities were made with various nation-states like the United States of America, the Seychelles, Jordan, and many

others. It is safe to say violent extremism influenced Kenya's defence policy and international relations by improving even further her relations with the United States and China. This was seen by the improved military hardware, armored vehicles, kits, and other security equipment delivered to Kenya by the People's Republic of China. According to Kibor (2016), the Department of Defence has always made use of the Kenyan government's surveillance capabilities and data sharing with other countries on terrorism issues. As a result, in 2018, Rachel Omamo, cabinet secretary of defence, signed an agreement to share intelligence on maritime security with Western Indian Ocean partners, Madagascar, the Seychelles, and Tanzania. Kenya has been able to form alliances with security agencies in other countries and cooperate, which provides significant details for the fight against extremism with countries such as the East Africa Standby Force (EASF). The Department of Foreign Affairs also connects Kenya with international organizations like the United Nations with the aim of pushing her national interests through international treaties. Kenya has indeed been identified as a strategic partner in the fight against extremism, and as a result, it has benefited more than any other country in the Horn of Africa. Kibet (2016) discovered that cooperation in the global war on terrorism financing has improved between Kenya and other progressive states and international bodies (Ambeyi, 2021). On July 18, 2022, Kenya-Seychelles defence cooperation was signed to enable joint military training on counter-terrorism and other areas. Other nations with joint training agreements with Kenya are Jordan, India, and the United States of America, among others. This coincides with the findings of Patterson (2015). All the above-highlighted moves came about as a result of constant engagement with violent extremist groups. This was against Kenya's 1990s salvo of diplomacy and dispute management procedures such as mediation and negotiation, among others. This demonstrated that violent extremism had a substantial influence on Kenya's defence strategy and foreign relations moves made throughout the period under consideration.



CHAPTER FIVE: SUMMARY, CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

5.0 Introduction

The purpose of this study was to look at the influence of violent extremism in Kenya's defence policy with Somalia as the case study. The study looked at cross border attacks and raids, violent extremism financing as some of the main reasons for this change of violent extremism in Kenya's defence policy in relation to international relation. Chapter contains, summary of the study findings, the conclusion of research findings, the recommendations and suggestion for further research in the field.

5.1. Summary of the Findings

5.1.1. Role of Cross Border Attacks in the influence of violent extremism in Kenya's Defense Policy

The study was intended to investigate the role of raids and attacks in the influence of violent extremism in Kenya's defence policy with Somalia. Respondents agreed that attacks on schools, shopping malls, and churches, motor vehicles in the larger north-eastern parts of Kenya, military bases, and security personnel. They also agreed that the abduction of government officials working in the northern part of Kenya and tourists were some of the triggers for the policy shift by the Kenyan government. The constant attacks on communication equipment like Safaricom masts, which are critical to communication in Kenya, and government installations like police stations in Mandera and Mpeketoni areas are some of the few examples. The Al-Shabaab's ways of entry into Kenya were through the vast Boni Forest and Indian Ocean in the Lamu and Kiunga areas; some came through the roads, disguising themselves as locals. They avoided travelling in vehicles transporting goods from Somalia to Kenya and major international airports for fear of being arrested by the Kenyan authorities.

The findings above demonstrate how porous Kenya's border is; you may enter Kenya from any border with Somalia. Because there are various entrance sites, this necessitated cross-border raids and attacks as terrorists entered Kenya with their weapons ready to commit acts of terror and manage to retreat back to Somalia without detection. To tame the runaway killings, abductions, and bombings, Kenya had to build a wall between her and Somalia and close down the Daadab refugee camp, among other measures. Therefore, cross-border raids and attacks contributed substantially to the influence of violent extremism in Kenya's defence policy shift with Somalia.

5.1.2. The role of sources of finance for violent extremism in Kenya's defence policy with Somalia

The study aimed to identify some of the sources of finance and how they contribute to violent extremism's influence on Kenya's defence policy shift towards Somalia. A review of the results showed that illegal poaching of ivory and tusks and live animals like pangolin, which was also featured in the study by Costa (2019) and that of Maguire & Haelein (2015), was the most trafficked. Around the time under review, there was a steady rise in poaching in Kenya and some parts of East Africa, where elephants and rhinos died as a result. These wildlife gems were being used to raise money to sponsor violent extremism in the region. This means that the illicit wildlife trade played a significant role in the funding as there was ready market. As for drugs and narcotics, the survey shows that they were being smuggled into the Kenyan market by the escort of the Al-Shabaab, who were doing it for the money, and a small portion remained for their consumption before going on raids and attacks. According to the facts presented above, hard drugs and narcotics were involved in the financing of violent extremism throughout the time period under consideration; this can be attested to by the UNMGSE report (2011). This also agrees with Durnagol (2009) findings on the role of drugs in terrorism and organized crime. In the research, to know which household goods were being smuggled across

the border to the Kenyan market to finance violent extremism, the researcher found out that cheap sugar, animal products, milk powder, canned meat, rice, and wear apparel were some of them. These items are sold in Nairobi, Mombasa, and the larger North Eastern parts of Kenya in legitimate businesses, but the profit goes back to Somalia. Lastly, taxation and extortion were the leading sources of finance, confirming the UNMGSE report (2011). Personal funding, or hawala (untraceable banking systems), was done by the locals in Somalia as well as in Kenya to give their contribution towards what they called "God's work." Sympathizers living in Western countries were also responsible for funding these Al-Shabaab through diaspora remittances, a fact supported by Maguire and Haelein (2015). All sources of finance, legal or illegal, played a major role in violent extremism financing: they supplied cash for VEG activities, and the money also promoted corruption in law enforcement and governmental/civil offices. All these enabled services, which were useful for VE, facilitation of movements of terrorist personnel, support for illicit arms acquisition, and the production of fake identification documents, which enabled the entry of VEG members to Kenya.

5.1.3 Influence of Violent Extremism on Kenya's Defence Policy and International Relations

The majority of the respondents supported tough immigration restrictions and control. These laws entailed filling out declaration forms at the airport stating your country of origin, your destination within the republic, and the nature of your business or purpose of your visit to that place (Agwanda, 2022). Restriction of direct flights from Somalia imposed in 2006: Kenya introduced strict procedure for flights leaving Mogadishu-Kenya route to stop at Wajir airport for inspection before proceeding to Nairobi. This wasn't the case for flights leaving Kenya for Somalia, a move termed by many as necessary evil. This was done to prevent the entry of terrorists through the Kenyan airports. National border surveillance. The military alliance

received approval, confirming Munene's (2015) position on the East Africa Standby Force (EASF). In 2016, there was the formation of a military alliance to beat the Al-Shabaab by influencing other East African countries to send their soldiers to Somalia to join her troops under AMISOM, Uganda followed the request. (Kimenyi & Kibe, 2014). Coordination with other governments in international policing, which is consistent with Ambeyi (2021) and Kebet (2016) in the fight against violent extremism, the construction of the Kenya-Somalia border wall, and Mutisya's (2017). This confirms that violent extremism had an influence on Kenya's defence policy and international relations during the time under review.

5.4 Conclusions

The first research objective was to analyse the role of sources of finance for violent extremism in influencing Kenya's defence policy with Somalia. The findings were that the sources of financing mentioned were very critical to the violent extremism groups. To curb the cash flow and sale of the same, Kenya's government came up with measures that changed Kenya's defence policy towards Somalia. In summation, with no sources of funds and financing, violent extremism will not flourish and continue in its active attacks. A violent extremist group in Somalia had legal and illegal businesses that were making profits to fund their activities, like the smuggling of hard drugs, narcotics, smuggling of goods across borders, illegal money services, and wildlife trafficking. This therefore meant going after their sources of finance; some businesses with the legitimate market in Somalia had to suffer.

The second objective was to analyse the role of border raids and attacks in the influence of violent extremism in Kenya's defence policy with Somalia from 2002–2022. The research found that border raids and attacks played a great role in shaping the defence policy towards Somalia. From the data collected and analysed, all of the respondents agreed that cross-border attacks and raids in Kenya and her interests like schools, shopping malls, and churches were very common. This was done by the movement of violent extremist groups from

Somalia to Kenya and back without being noticed by border security, and that has necessitated attacks on Kenyan soil. These extremists come with their small arms and light weapons, which they use in the commission of these acts of violence against Kenya's citizens. This forced the Kenyan government to act swiftly by closing the border with Somalia, closing down the Daadab refugee camp, and building a Kenya-Somalia border wall to keep out violent extremist groups. These strategies were seen as a serious foreign policy shift given the cordial relationship between Kenya and Somalia before the start of violent extremist activities on Kenya's soil.

Lastly, from the study, the following were concluded: national security Readiness, military standardisation and joint military training with other nations, strict immigration laws and regulations, Restriction of direct flights from Somalia, national border surveillance, military alliance, East Africa Standby Force (EASF), coordination with other states in international policing, and building of the Kenya-Somalia border wall. There were very necessary steps taken by the government of Kenya to caution against the constant attacks from the Al-Shabaab; this meant bringing on board various states and multinationals as well as bilateral agreements on the way forward in terms of security, guarding territorial integrity, and interests.

5.4 Recommendations

Based on the study findings, the research came up with the following

1. The study recommends that, Kenya and Somalia governments should have a bilateral agreement on the identification, tracing and profiling of all legal businesses or illegal sources of finance for the violent extremist groups, sanctioned and closed down permanently. Formation of drug enforcement units within the KDF to control, track

and trace drugs/narcotics flow in the country, especially in the northern and the coastal parts of the country.

2. Kenya and Somalia governments should collaborate in border security through border monitoring, sharing of intelligence, and controlling the movement of people to deny entry by violent extremist groups. Use of modern equipment, such as hi-tech surveillance and armed unmanned aerial vehicles, to secure the vast borderline between the two countries.
3. The study recommends multilateral training and collaboration in the formulation of foreign policy approaches that are non-militaristic or punitive in nature for the neighboring countries. International collaboration and benchmarking with other nation-states coping with violent extremism, such as the Philippines, the United States of America and France, should endeavor to be fostered to come up with the best solution.

Suggestion for further Studies

Further study should be conducted to determine how transnational humans trafficking supports violent extremism which subsequently affects national security and defence strategy in the Horn of Africa. The scope should be widened in terms of chronology, places, and respondents

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APPENDICES

APPENDIX 1: CONSENT FORM

CONSENT TO PARTICIPATE IN RESEARCH PROJECT

RESEARCH TOPIC: ANALYSIS OF THE INFLUENCE OF VIOLENT EXTREMISM IN KENYA'S DEFENCE POLICY WITH SOMALI (2002-2022)

PRINCIPLE INVESTIGATER: Wellingtone Mayo Agumba

I. PURPOSE OF YOUR PARTICIPATION IN THE RESEARCH

As part of the research I do understand that the aim of the research is to help in the topic: ANALYSIS OF THE INFLUENCE OF VIOLENT EXTREMISM IN KENYA'S DEFENCE POLICY WITH SOMALI (2002-2022)

I do confirm that I have read and clearly understand the general purpose of the research and requested to participate in answering interview and questionnaire form questions forming part of the research.

II. VOLUNTARY PARTICIPATION

I understand that my participation in this study is voluntary and therefore I can freely withdraw my participation at any given stage and time. No adverse action will be taken against me for withdrawal of my participation in the research and my responses will be withdrawn and destroyed immediately.

III. RISKS.

There are no risks that I will be exposed to during and after the research.

IV. BENEFITS OF THE RESEARCH

My participation in the research will provide valuable information that will be used in understanding better the above stated research topic. Hence policy formation in various government departments and will also be used as teaching aid and learning material in various institutions of higher learning in the country and beyond.

V. ANONYMITY AND CONFIDENTIALITY

My confidentiality and identity protection will be safely guarded during and after the study as the information I provide will not have my name and but only a subject number will be used during the analysis of the data and final report writing.

I agree to be interviewed, recorded in audio recorder or give my opinion by filling in a questionnaire form which will be destroyed after coding, tabulation, transcription and interpretation. My signature does not give permission to the researcher or the supervisor to show my video and audiotapes to anyone else.

I voluntarily agree to take part in the study having full knowledge that my contribution will be used in the publication of learning materials and policy formulation.

Respondent's signature.....Date.....

Name of the Person obtaining consent.....SignDate.....

APPENDIX II: QUESTIONNAIRE FORM

PART A: INTRODUCTORY

(i) **Designation:** Prof, { } Dr. { } Mr. { } Mrs. { } Miss { }

(ii) **Department**

{ } National Counter Terrorism Centre

{ } Ministry of Foreign Affairs

{ } Kenya Defence Forces

{ } Immigration Officials

(iii) **Level of Education**

{ } Secondary

{ } Diploma

{ } Graduate

{ } Post-Graduate

PART B (I): ANALYSIS OF VIOLENT EXTREMISM

1a. Do you know what violent extremism is?

(a) Yes { }

(b) No { }

1b. Where did you hear about violent extremism? (Cross the bracket)

(a) Firsthand experience { }

(b) Field work { }

(c) Others _____

2 How violent extremism financing influenced Kenya's defense policy with Somalia from 2002-2022

(a). In your opinion do you agree that these are the current top sources of violent extremism financing?

(i). Smuggling of goods across the border ()

- (ii). Illegal animal poaching ()
- (iii). Illegal money service ()
- (iv). Smuggling of hard drugs and narcotics ()

Others-----

2a (i). In your opinion, what are some of the smuggled hard drugs and narcotics?

- a) Bhang ()
- b) Heroin ()
- c) Cocaine ()
- d) Opium ()

Others.....

.....

2a (ii) In your own opinion what are the goods being smuggled across the border to finance violent extremism.

- a) Sugar ()
- b) Milk powder ()
- c) Rice ()
- d) Wear apparel ()

Others.....

....

2a (iii) In your own opinion, what are the wildlife gems being smuggled to finance violent Extremism.

- a) Ivory ()
- b) Game meat ()
- c) Animal skin/hide ()

d) Live animals ()

Others.....

.....

2a (iv) In your opinion, what are the illegal money services being used to finance violent extremism.

a) Hawala ()

b) Diaspora Remittances ()

c) Personal Funding ()

d) System of taxation ()

Others.....

...

3. How cross border raids and attacks influenced Kenya's defence policy with Somalia from 2002-2022

3a) Types of Raids and Attacks

(i) Abduction of government officials and tourists

(ii) Attacks on military bases and security personnel

(iii) Attacks on schools, shopping malls and churches

(iv) Attacks on motor vehicles in the larger north Eastern part of Kenya

(v) Attacks on government installations and communication equipment's.

Others-----

-

3b How do they cross the border to Kenya?

(i) Through the vast Boni Forest

(ii) Through the Indian Ocean in Lamu and Kiunga areas

(iii) Trafficked by motor vehicles transporting goods across the border.

(iv) Through common roads from Somalia by the locals

(v) Through major International Airports

PART B (II): INTERVIEW GUIDE FOR KEY INFORMANTS

4. In your opinion, how would you characterize the influence of violent extremism in general in Kenya's defense foreign policy and International relations over the last two decades?



Appendix III: Letter of Introduction



DIRECTORATE OF GRADUATE STUDIES

MIRD/2019/53791

8th August, 2023

National Commission for Science Technology & Innovation (NACOSTI)
Off Waiyaki Way, Upper Kabete,
P.O Box 30623- 00100
NAIROBI, KENYA

Dear Sir/Madam,


RE: WELLINGTONE MAYO AGUMBA– REGISTRATION NO. MIRD/2019/53791

The purpose of this letter is to introduce the above named student who is pursuing **Master of Arts in International Relation and Diplomacy** in the department of **Institute of Security Studies, Justice and Ethics** in the school of **Social Sciences**

The title of the thesis is "**Analysis into the Role of Violent Extremism on Defence Policy in the Horn of Africa: Case of Kenya with Somali (2002- 2022).**" It has been cleared by the University's Ethics Review Committee (Certificate attached) and now has to proceed to the field to collect data between **August, 2023 and October, 2023.**

Any assistance accorded to the student will be highly appreciated.


Thank you.


Dr. Samuel M. Karenga, Ph.D
Director, Graduate Studies
Enc.


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Chartered and ISO 9001 : 2015 Certified Institution.
Unlocking Infinite Possibilities

Appendix IV: Research Permit




REPUBLIC OF KENYA



**NATIONAL COMMISSION FOR
SCIENCE, TECHNOLOGY & INNOVATION**

RefNo: 740253 **Date of Issue: 23/August/2023**

RESEARCH LICENSE




This is to Certify that Mr. WELLINGTON MAYO AGUMBA of Mount Kenya University, has been licensed to conduct research as per the provision of the Science, Technology and Innovation Act, 2013 (Rev.2014) in Nairobi on the topic: ANALYSIS INTO THE ROLE OF VIOLENT EXTREMISM ON DEFENCE POLICY IN THE HORN OF AFRICA: CASE OF KENYA WITH SOMALI (2002 - 2022) > for the period ending : 23/August/2024.

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
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Scan the QR Code using QR scanner application.**

See overleaf for conditions

APPENDIX V: Map of study Area



Map of Nairobi

Source: Goggle map, 2024

Mount Kenya

